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PREFACE
This Report summarizes the results of an independent evaluation conducted
by OAO Corporation in 1981 for the Technology Transfer Division of the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). OAO was asked to
review broadly the "user requirements process" employed by NASA for ter-
restrial remote sensing applications programs. The subject iteslf was
recognized as extremely complex, and the evaluation was of limited scope
and reiterative through several phases that had special points of focus
established by the NASA sponsor. The present Report summarizes the analy-
tical approach used by OAO, and the principal findings and conclusions from
the evaluation. Its purpose is to serve as a basis for management review
and discussion.
This Report has not been coordinated or reviewed in detail by the NASA
sponsor, and therefore does not represent the official views of NASA. Its
contents, and the views expressed are the responsibility of the authors:
Roland S. Inlow, the principal investigator, and Don L. Olson, associate
investigator.
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1.0 INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
1.1 THE PROBLEM
In early 1981, the Technology Transfer Division of NASA requested this
evaluation to support an ongoing review of questions that were being raised
concerning the adequacy of NASA's user requirements process for applica-
tions-related terrestrial remote sensing programs. It was recognized that
the subject, itself, was complicated, has a long history, and that the
'extant processes may be as good as it is reasonable to expect. The
questions, themselves, were sometimes general, and often seemed to reflect
no more than a sense of frustration or general unease with the current
approaches. They frequently arose from problems encountered with NASA-
user interfaces.
Collectively, the questions reflected a general characterization of the
NASA approach to user requirements that had the following elements:
o Ad Hoc. For NASA applications-oriented activities, most "user
requirements" are developed, one-time, as part of the support for
technical program initiatives. User and technical resources are
marshaled to provide requirements inputs to the specific program
and then are disbanded. The approach generally involves user-
technical interaction through a Study, Task Force, Workshop,
Symposium or other one-time mechanism. It is frequently seen as a
solution in search of a problem.
o No Follow Up. It is common to regard the user requirements as
completed, once stated, partly because the ad hoc groups that
developed them no longer have cognizance, and partly because NASA
program focus transfers from program initiation to program execu-
tion. There are no mechanisms for follow-up, and little account-
ability.
o Credibility Questioned. The combination of ad hoc initial mecha-
nisms and the absence of follow up, causes the credibility of the
original user requirements to be increasingly questioned as time
.1
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passes and circumstances change. The authoritative original
bases become subject to challenge.
o Participation Not Representative. Selection of persons or organ-
izations to participate in the initial user requirements develop-
ment activity appears biased to outsiders, and sometimes even to
those involved. It is seen as self-serving to specialized user
and NASA interests. It is described as an "old-boy" network.
o Varying Methodology. The methods used to develop the user
requirements are so different from discipline-to-discipline and
from program-to-pro gram, that it is very difficult to make cross-
discipline or cross-program comparisons and evaluations, or to
aggregate user requirements in support of broader budgetary and
executive reviews. . ,
The initial focus of the review was on evaluating the accuracy and signifi-
cance of the foregoing characterizations. If they were essentially cor-
rect, did it matter? To whom? Were there practical alternatives? It was
recognized that there were many potential approaches involving different
levels of detail and organizational arrangements that might improve the
user requirements processes. Some of these, however, overlapped or in-
volved competing objectives. The analytical problem, as defined, was to
evaluate issues and alternatives, and attempt to identify steps that would
help the evolution of more nearly continuous, systematic, and represen-
tative user requirements processes than those employed in the past.
1.2 OBJECTIVES AND SCOPE
The defined objective was to provide support for the evolution of increas-
ingly sound user requirements definition processes that would meet the
broad range of NASA's terrestrial applications planning and management
needs during the 1980's.
It was decided that the review would be approached through a multi-phased
reiterative process focused on key issues; at a modest level of effort;
conducted by independent and experienced senior professional personnel.
The review was not scoped to be a paper study that would involve extensive
2
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documentation or the large scale of some previous NASA studies. As ori-
ginally visualized, the evaluation process was to involve close continuing
interaction with the NASA Technical Officer and to a lesser degree NASA/
OSTA managers. Changes in NASA personnel, organization, and in the scope
of the project, resulted in somewhat less regular interaction with NASA
managers than planned.
One of the principal perceived benefits of the review was that it would be
an independent evaluation by senior, experienced, personnel who were not,
themselves, managerially involved in the NASA or user programs. It was
anticipated that much of the material developed would be familiar to NASA
or user managers. It was hoped, however, that useful insights would emerge
from the different focus that the independent review would give to an old
and largely intractable subject.
The material was to be developed in as open and frank a process as possible
in an effort to give NASA a frank view of itself as seen by others outside
the Agency. NASA guidance was that the results should be reported as
found, without dilution or concern for the bureaucratic or policy implica-
tions. The primary interest was in evaluating the user requirements pro-
cesses as they functioned in the "real world" at the senior and middle-
management levels.
The review was focused more on land remote sensing (represented by Landsat)
than on the atmospheric or oceanic disciplines because of the known com-
plexities and issues relating to user requirements for land remote
sensing. As a result, the focus was inevitably somewhat more on applica-
tions with operational user implications than on purely scientific inves-
tigations or one-time experimental/demonstration activities. It was
recognized that NASA's role and interaction with "operational" users was,
itself a matter of some controversy, but review of that aspect and its
implications was one of the objectives of the review.
1.3 METHOD AND APPROACH
The planned approach initially involved four phases of activity.
o Phase I: Take stock, clarify problems and issues, and identify
alternative processes that warrant in-depth review;
o Phase II: Develop a plan for the in-depth review of the alter-
native processes;
o Phase III: In-depth review, development of conclusions and
recommendations for management consideration;
o Phase IV: Support management actions on recommendations.
A decision was made during the project to limit the activity to the first
three phases, with a somewhat reduced scope. A separate review and pre-
sentation of findings was made at the end of Phase II, taking account of
data developed to that point. The present Report summarizes the overall
activities and findings.
The flow of the analysis and general method are shown in Figure 1.
As the figure shows, the initial step involved review of the issues and
problems associated with the user requirements processes as characterized
above. The next steps involved selection of persons to be interviewed,
with the criteria that they be senior experienced people directly involved
with the NASA processes. Selection of additional people for interview
during the course of the review was a continuing activity based on informa-
tion and findings as developed. Documents were selected for review on the
basis of pertinence, or as recommended by those interviewed.
A principal source of data was interviews with knowledgeable people.
During the course of the overall evaluation, about 70 detailed inter-
views/discussions, lasting 3-4 hours each, were held with experienced mid-
to-senior-level managers who were directly involved in day-to-day uses, or
planning for the uses, of data from NASA remote sensing systems. A deci-
sion was made early in the project to emphasize in-depth interviews with a
4
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limited number of people rather than larger numbers of shallower discus-
sions. Personnel were selected to represent interests and knowledge from a
range of organizations, internal and external to NASA, at different stages
of the user requirements development process.
Detailed notes were made during the interview, for use by the authors. To
promote openness and frankness, the discussions were held with the under-
standing that the views expressed would not be attributed to the indi-
viduals, although most indicated that they were quite willing to be quoted.
A number of additional, but less extensive, discussions were held on the
subject with other individuals who are involved in various aspects of the
user requirements process. The selection of interviews was not designed to
be a statistically representative sample of NASA and user personnel. It
was designed to be practical, in the sense that all of the persons inter-
viewed were experienced mid-to senior-level people who were directly
involved with NASA remote sensing activities or with the satisfaction of
major user needs. It was judged that their views, collectively, together
with document reviews, guidance from the NASA Technical Officer, and other
discussions, would be sufficient to illuminate the issues.
Two subject areas, geologic mapping and domestic crop production
reporting, were selected for examination in greater depth than others
during Phase III of the evaluation. They were chosen, with the guidance of
NASA managers, as illustrative of important subjects that have involved a
range of interaction with NASA remote sensing programs over a number of
years, and reflect the different interests, problems and breadth of con-
suierations involved in the_management of.the user requirements processes.
About 40 of our in-depth interviews were with senior-and middle-level
managers in the geology and agricultural fields and we developed large
amounts of detailed data from the interviews and related document reviews.
These data are much too detailed for presentation in a summary report but
provide an important base for a number of our judgments. Some selected
observations on these subjects are provided in an appendix.
Throughout the evaluation we attempted to identify the recurrent themes in
terms of the perceived problems, the processes used to develop and manage
requirements, the mechanisms employed, and finally, a frank understanding
of what works, and what doesn't.
From the foregoing data, we attempted to develop findings and conclusions
that focused on the issues raised, the problems that are encountered, an
assessment of the future outlook, and our recommendations.
1.3.1 Topic Complexity
At every level, there is a recognition that the topic "user requirements
process" is inherently complex.
o Definitional - The terms, themselves, mean many things to many
people and may be defined quite differently depending on the
discipline or group involved.
o Diverse User Communities - There are literally thousands of indi-
vidual users of NASA-originated remote sensing data, world-wide,
and hundreds of scientific investigations in progress. User com-
munities for the different disciplines vary significantly in
scale, location, and homogeneity.
o Diverse Stages - Different users are in vastly different stages
of evolution in their levels of understanding of remote sensing
possibilities, and in the maturity and sophistication of their
analyses. These range from basic scientific research on the one
hand, to support of "operational" decisionmaking on the other.
Some regimes (e.g., meteorology) have had many years of space-
borne application, while others (e.g. oceanic) are still in their
infancy.
o Varied Disciplines and Applications - Each discipline, and appli-
cations within disciplines, generally have unique attributes not
present in others. The variety of potentially fruitful research
or applications involving remote sensing, in detail, are almost
limitless.
o Embodied Problems - The combination of the different institu-
tional settings, the planning process, management practices,
priorities, national policies, etc., present a difficult environ-
ment in which to develop user requirements.
o Remote Sensing Role - The utility of space-borne civil remote
sensing is in many cases complementary to data derived from other
more conventional sources. Measuring the marginal utility of
remote sensing is a formidable problem.
1.3.2 Definitions
There are many types and levels of "requirements" and there were widely
varying views on how "user requirements" should be defined, including for
the present review. There was almost universal agreement that, today, the
terms mean many different things to many people, and that it would be valu-
able to have commonly agreed understandings. Toward one end of the spec-
trum there are design specifications ("requirements") that are used to
guide the processes of technical design and construction of remote sensing
instruments and systems. At the other end there are user information needs
("requirements") that are the user-oriented bases for technical action in
the first place. There are many levels of detail and different points of
focus along the entire requirements spectrum, with different emphasis by
different participants and organizations.
There was also the continuing question of whether "requirements" should be
considered to be independent of the technical capabilities to meet them.
There was no common view on this aspect, but it had a major bearing on the
way some participants viewed the processes, roles, and so on.
For evaluation of the user requirements process, a working definition of
terms was developed, as follows:
o User - Person or organization responsible for decisions or1
assessments based in whole, or in part, on information acquired
from remote sensing.
o User Requirement: Statement of the information needed by a user,
and associated availability criteria.
8
o User Requirements Process - The combined steps taken to identify
users, define their information needs, and effect the translation
of these into specifications and characteristics that define the
response to the needs that is feasible through the employment of
spaceborne remote sensing technology.
o Mechanisms - Methods of handling and managing the interactions
necessary for the process to function.
1.3.3 Organization of the Report
The following sections of the Report have been organized to present a
distillation of the extensive data and wide variety of views that we
encountered during the evaluation, together with our own observations
developed from all of the data we examined. With a topic of this complex-
ity and known diversity of views, we recognize that our selection of
material will inevitably seem incomplete and represent support for some
views and a slighting of others. We have not attempted to evaluate them as
"right" or "wrong", but rather as examples of viewpoints that NASA and user
managers held, and felt were of sufficient importance to air in relation to
this topic. The Report is intended as a basis for discussion and manage-
ment consideration. The sequence of the Report is outlined briefly below.
In Section 2, we review the Elements of the. Problem under the following
headings:
o 2.1, Institutional Setting, discusses some of the differences in
institutional arrangements and outlook between NASA and users
that affect the development and management of user requirements
data.
o 2.2, Stages in the Process, discusses the variety of stages and
data content that are involved in the full span of the processes
from identification of user information needs on one end, to the
design and operation of a technical response to those needs, at
the other end. Discipline differences are discussed.
\
o 2.3, User Communities, discusses some of the problems encountered
in identifying "users" in a consistent fashion, both individually
9
and collectively, together with factors that affect NASA-user
interaction. A distinction is made between "uses" and "users."
o 2.4, Processes and Mechanisms for Interaction, presents some of
the views that were encountered concerning the applicability and
usefulness of the wide variety of processes and mechanisms that
are available. What works, what doesn't.
o 2.5, Strengths and Weaknesses, discusses the most frequently
cited strengths and weaknesses in NASA's approach to the user
requirements process.
In Section 3, we draw upon the material reviewed in Section 2, and provide
an evaluation in the following context:
o An Alternative Mechanisms section (3.1) discusses a number of
proposals that were made for the user requirements processes and
the special points of emphasis that proponents advanced. These
are evaluated.
o An Elements of An Optimum Process section (3.2) summarizes the
common elements and necessary conditions that need to be combined
in evolving an optimum user requirements process.
o A Conclusions and Issues section (3.3) presents several general
conclusions and identifies some of the issues that appear to be
central to the question of improving the effectiveness of the
user requirements processes.
o A final section (3.4) presents Recommendations.
The Appendix presents some selected observations and data from our review
of geologic mapping and domestic crop production reporting programs.
1.0
2.0 ELEMENTS OF THE PROBLEM
2.0 ELEMENTS OF THE PROBLEM
2.1 INSTITUTIONAL SETTING
The institutional setting has a major bearing on the process of identifying
and developing user requirements data. The differences in the setting need
to be taken into account and accommodated for the user requirements defini-
tion process to be effective.
2.1.1 Federal Sector
In the federal sector, there is an institutional mis-match between NASA's
research orientation and related approaches to program definition and
problem solving, and the approaches of "old line" Departments like Agri-
culture and Interior. These Departments and others at the same time, have
had major user interests in a number of NASA remote sensing programs.
o The large Federal Departments consist of semi-autonomous Bureaus
or Agencies that perform specialized functions, which are
generally long-standing and legislatively mandated. The programs
of these agencies have their own complex histories. They
generally rely on conventional information sources and data
gathering methods that have evolved over many years and are
embedded firmly in the outlook and practices of these agencies.
Old line agencies also have well established and strongly sup-
portive constituencies that rally behind them when programs are
challenged. Improvements via space remote sensing or innovative
techniques are welcomed if they are proven reliable, and cost-
effective, but there is little independent incentive to take
risky initiatives. As one manager put it, "no chief will have
programs live or die on the basis of uncertain technology and
program continuity. . . he will stand pat."
o NASA, on the other hand, is a young agency without long-standing
functions, or established constituencies like those of the
Departments of Agriculture and Interior. Compared with the old
line agencies, NASA's science- or applications-oriented programs
11
are more variable from year-to-year, need more continuing justi-
fication, and frequently are higher visibility, risky endeavors.
All agencies, however, are sensitive to criticism, and this
causes even old line agencies to be open to new approaches and
technology, if they prove feasible and are reliable.
o NASA has more elaborately structured external processes for
reviewing and evaluating programs than those used by old-line
agencies. NASA, for example, has the variety of advisory groups
that meet periodically. These range from an Agency-wide advisory
.Council, to specialized Advisory Committees and Subcommittees in
specialized discipline areas, as well as Technical Review
Committees for oversight of technical approaches. There are few
counterparts of these bodies in old line agencies.
o Many old line agency programs just "go", on the basis of legisla-
tive mandate or long standing practice. The annual justification
for these programs is rarely questioned in a fundamental way.
The differences in basic orientation between NASA and old line agencies
affect their approach to "user requirements".
o NASA is characterized as having engineers/scientists who look at
user requirements like a moon shot: Objectives are defined; a
fixed schedule is set; the requirements, once stated, do not
change. The NASA orientation is to know concretely what is to be'
done before starting, with "requirements" tailored to technical
capabilities, and the over-all program is one of executing.
"Success" consists of designing, building, and operating the
technical apparatus.
o Old line agencies, on the other hand, are characterized as having
frequently changing user requirements. The "real" requirements
come from people responsible for making decisions. Their infor-
mation needs are rarely ever fully satisfied, and new techniques
or sources of information are judged valuable even when the
improvements are small. Whether technical capabilities exist to
12
address the information needs is incidental to the statement of a
requirement.
o What seem to others to be small incremental improvements in data
development capabilities, therefore, often have sufficient value
to old line agencies to warrant support and action. NASA pro-
grams, on the other hand, tend to be driven toward bigger and more
glamorous objectives because of the demands of the program justi-
fication and budgeting cycle.
In the applications area, NASA "has gotten over the major learning period
with self-initiated projects. There are fewer and fewer areas of applica-
tions-related research that are brand new, glamorous, and subject to broad
executive and congressional support." The absence of an authoritative
user requirements process handicaps the development of program support.
Its research activities are viewed by many as being carried out for
research's sake, and the application is the carrot on the stick.
o The problem that these circumstances creates is "how to plan in
NASA when there is no certainty that other agencies are planning
to use the output 5 to 7 years hence after NASA development or
demonstration is completed." Other agencies, on the other hand,
are reluctant to commit resources because of uncertainty about
the continuity and long run viability of the NASA remote sensing
programs. There is no market mechanism.
One of the main challenges of the user requirements process lies in the
fragmentation of missions and responsibilities among the Federal Govern-
ment agencies that comprise, overall, the biggest user market. The situa-
tion is compounded by fragmentation within NASA. Under these circum-
stances the user requirements process is continually plagued with the
problem of attempting to provide concrete linkages between interests that
are ambiguously defined, and the result is uncertainty and inefficiency on
both sides of the interface.
o Fragmentation throughout the Federal Government is regarded by
some as the major cause of difficulty in attacking the NASA/user
interface. There is an absence of specific goals related to
13
remote sensing. There are no recognized spokespersons on many
issues and subjects. In their absence, there is a vacuum for
which no one feels responsible.
o The fundamental need for requirements definition is at the
highest levels of management where the highest level planning
should take place, and where major decisions get made. Unfortu-
nately, it is very difficult to obtain support for long range
space applications from the highest levels in user agencies. The
highest levels are short-assignment political appointees, with
generally limited professional expertise, and with many competing
interests for attention.
2.1.2 Private Sector
There are pronounced differences in the institutional setting of NASA and
the private sector. These differences affect their outlook on the process
of requirements definition, and on what the goals of the process should be.
From the private sector viewpoint, no NASA research program (except for
basic scientific research) should be undertaken without an ultimate opera-
tional user's needs specifically in mind. Remote sensing is simply another
means to specific ends. In this view, a user requirements process must
deal with the remote sensing system end-to-end, and consider the needs of
both "operational" and "research" users. NASA has traditionally concen-
trated on the latter at the expense of the former.
o It makes a lot of difference, for example, if "user requirements"
equals a scientific "wish list" or equals legislatively-mandated
information needs that the responsible agency must meet. . .or
something in between.
o From the private point of view, the ground rules should be that a
"requirement" hasn't been defined until a user has been identi-
fied who is willing to pay for the eventual product.
Industry has to define requirements very carefully because the governing
element is the ability to pay and have a quick return on investment (two to
four years). The Government is poorest in this respect because ability to
14
pay doesn't come into play in the way it does in commercial activities.
The Government is also "generally poor at marketing, because it has no
concrete incentive to develop a market, se l l ing and evolving products."
o A private owner would have to have end-to-end control to deliver
specific products against contracts, or go out of business.
o The Government does not go out of business if it f a i l s to deliver.
In many instances it provides its services/products without
charge.
NASA has a legislated mandate for research, but, in the private view, all
such research (except basic) should be connected with a potential opera-
tional user's demand.
o The expensiveness of space systems is such that the Government
must lead in ident i fy ing its own needs for remote sensing pro-
ducts. But, there are very few people in Government who even
th ink about those needs. There is l i t t le authoritative consoli-
dated data on what the Government is required to do by law and the
related remote sensing data needs.
If a corporation were the owner/operator of the c iv i l land remote sensing
system, for example, its l i fe blood would be in determining user needs
(requirements) and s e l l i ng responsive products to customers. The primary
point with regard to user requirements is that NASA and private commercial
users view information needs (requirements) and the potential u t i l i ty of
space borne remote sensing from very different in i t i a l perspectives and
interests. NASA's is much more open-ended, w h i l e the private sector is
quali tat ive and market oriented. Interaction requires special arrange-
ments on both sides of the interface.
2.1.3 Scientific - Academic Sector
NASA's inst i tutional setting and practices most closely approximate those
of the sc ient i f ic -academic sector. NASA's basic charter is to conduct
space related research. The "users" of many NASA remote sensing program
outputs, for years, have largely been scientists. The programs have been
research-oriented, aimed at improving basic knowledge, or developing the
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means of improving it. Even when NASA has acted as a contractor for
operational systems, such as NOAA's meteorological satellites, its focus
has been on developing the technology for improved sensing and under-
standing basic phenomena.
Many of the scientific users of NASA's research output are supported by
NASA funding, and there are common and closely-knit user communities that
involve the interaction of small numbers of key scientists and NASA person-
nel, on individual projects or investigations. In general, there is close,
continuing interaction through various scientifc advisory bodies and the
mechanisms of the scientific community at large.
2.2 STAGES IN THE PROCESS
There are two generally accepted ways to approach the formulation of user
requirements for remote sensing:
o What information is extractable from remote sensing?
o What problems need solving?
From either direction, when carried to their conclusion, these approaches
should arrive at the same point. NASA typically starts from the first
direction, users from the second.
There are, in turn, a specific set of stages that are involved in the
requirements definition process, regardless of the starting point, the
specific subject, or whether a scientific investigation or broader user
application is involved:
o Identify the user problem
o Identify the information required to solve the problem
o Specify the data required to produce the information (accuracy,
scale, format, type...)
o Specify the measurements required to produce the data (spatial
resolution, spectral resolution . . .)
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o Identify and evaluate technological approaches to providing the
measurements, including remote sensing
The contents of each stage differ significantly in internal detail,
depending on the discipline and type of application, and the process of
translating from one stage to the next involves the use of a model(s) that
relates the adjoining stages to each other. Overall, there are several
orders of models involved in the stage-to-stage translation process.
3.2.1 General Structure
It is very important to identify systematically the stages involved in the
"user requirements process." In practice, it is difficult for personnel
working on specific detailed aspects, to have perspective or competence on
the entire process. A major problem, for example, is that most users
cannot state requirements in terms of remote sensing measurement values
needed, but only in terms of information needs. As a result, it does not
make sense as is often done, to ask them to express their requirements in
terms of spatial resolution, spectral bands, etc. needed. They really do
not know. Sometimes they do not know that they do not know. "Users should
be asked to concentrate on defining their data needs.
NASA, typically, "has not done well in defining the remote sensing data
needs (scales, accuracies, formats, types, etc.) that allow measurment
requirements (spatial, temporal and spectral resolution, etc.) to be
defined. Data requirements are confused with measurements." NASA tech-
nology usually comes first, then users are sought.
Different people, skills and interests are involved at different levels of
the user requirements process, and there, are considerable differences in
the way the stages in the process are visualized by those involved. It was
found throughout the interviews and discussions that specific functions or
activities related to individual stages in the process were regularly des-
cribed, but very few observers outlined the full span—from user need to
technical response—in a systematic way.
Figure 2 presents a consolidated diagram of the various stages involved in
the generalized user requirements process, together with the types of
17
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people involved, and the problem areas most often cited for the stage. The
reader is invited to review Figure 2 carefully, because it summarizes a
considerable amount of data that are not further elaborated. (An example
related to geologic mapping is presented in the Appendix). As noted
previously, the technical content of each stage is different and many
different methods (models) are used to effect the translation from one
stage to the next. In practice, it was found that it was hard to pin down
who was responsible for organization or management of the technical con-
tent of different stages. Except for narrowly focused scientific
research, the span of the full user requirements process in most fields is
too extensive to be managed totally from either end. The detailed content
of the stages are, themselves, technically complex, and the models (people
or algorithms) used to make the transformation from one stage to the next
may also be complex.
It is important in the first instance for the senior people in all sectors
to define the problems that are important. These need to be defined with
sufficient authority and stability that they can be used as sound bases for
the development and organization of requirements as inputs to the multi-
year planning processes that accompany any significant space program. k
As implied from the data in Figure 2, Tough and lengthy processes are then
involved in organizing people to attack all levels of the requirements
process. The complete process for most subjects is very extensive and
complex.
The organization and management of requirements-related data that is
developed in relation to these various stages is an old problem, and is
reviewed in some detail in some of the older studies. . There have been
many major ad hoc NASA and inter-agency Studies that have catalogued the
various user problems that could be attacked via remote sensing. These
have included data content of the different stages, the models involved in
the processes of translating technically from originating statements of
users' information needs, through the various stages, to the definition of
remote sensing systems with characteristics responsive to those needs.
There is, however, no currently consistent approach to the delineation of
the different stages involved, even for planning and management support
purposes. We found, in general, that most participants viewed the "user
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requirements process" as involving no more than the contents of the stage-
or-two adjacent to their own activities.
The few detailed studies that contain extensive assessments through the
full sequence of requirements stages, are by now, from about four to ten or
more years old. While they contain much data that remain valid, they also
are enough out of date, to be questioned by critics, and to be doubtful as
primary requirements bases for current programs. There appears, overall,
to be little effort to deal with these steps explicitly in current pro-
grams .
2.2.2 Discipline Differences
The inherent difficulty in defining and managing the information flows
involved in multi-staged user requirements processes is in some respects
proportional to the breadth of the discipline and the scale and composition
of the user community involved. There was general agreement among the
observers interviewed, for example, that the full span of the user require-
ments process was the most easily managed for highly focused scientific
investigations, and the most difficult for broadly based programs such as
land remote sensing for Earth resources evaluation.
o Specialized scientific investigations are complicated in their
own right, but most often involve small and select user commun-
ities, and concretely stated scientific objectives. Identifica-
tion of the user information needs for an investigation may be
spelled out in detail and their technical relationship to
measurements and sensing instruments may be evaluated in highly
concrete terms. The user-scientists may even be able to work
closely with the sensor system design engineers to assist in
design and provide guidance on technical trade-offs. The
"stages" in the user requirements process are developed as
needed, during the give-and-take evaluation that accompanies the
search for the optimum technical approach to the investigation.
The importance of the investigation and support for its conduct
is generally sanctioned by scientific peer reviews and through
scientific advisory bodies. In short, the "users" are largely
scientists. The programs are research-oriented, aimed at
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improving basic knowledge. "Requirements" are not separate
aspects, but just part of the contunuing interaction that takes
place on several levels. User needs are translated into a program
response when circumstances are "ripe."
o Broadly-based programs such as land remote sensing, on the other
hand, have so many overlapping areas of scientific investigation
and practical application, together with extensive and hetero-
geneous user communities, that there is little possibility of
having the close and direct interaction between "users" and
remote sensing system designers that is feasible with a special-
ized scientific investigation. Different arrangements and mecha-
nisms are needed to be effective in managing the development of
more broadly based requirements. There are no established peer
review mechanisms. A number of observers who were interviewed
-felt that one of the major problems in the user requirements area
was that NASA's scientific orientation has caused it to develop
user requirements generally by methods that are most nearly ger-
mane to highly focused scientific research. In the more broadly
based program, "users" include personnel who need information for
decision purposes. These programs are applications oriented.
"Requirements" are definable at several levels, and to be respon-
sive to user needs, there is a need to have accurate technical
translation from level-to-level with some means of regular inter-
action between user interests and technical design interests.
These do not exist today in any formal way.
2.3 USER COMMUNITIES
An effective user requirements definition process depends in part having a
clear understanding of who the "users" are, and how they are organized
collectively. "User communities" in the various applications disciplines
differ widely in size, scope, location, and methods of interacting with
NASA. The term, in the present context, signifies the collection of
individuals and organizations that have a common interest or stake in, and
use the products of, NASA-originated space remote sensing.
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A key consideration in evaluating the NASA user requirements process is
that NASA, itself, is rarely a member of the "user community". Its direct
mission includes the development, construction, testing and operation for
research purposes, of space systems. It has a more ambiguously defined
role with respect to direct support of various user communities, although
there has been general agreement that it should support at least the
federal government agencies. The fact that NASA is rarely a "user" compli-
cates the interaction process. Some of the observers interviewed thought
that the main reason NASA doesn't have a comprehensive user requirements
process is because it does not have functional (operational) responsibili-
ties to acquire Earth and other sciences data for its own use.
A continuing issue in assessing the user requirements process, is how to
identify the "user communities" that NASA programs serve, and the links
that NASA managers should have with those users. Across the spectrum, the
answer (again) is relatively much simpler for scientific investigations
related to programs such as upper atmospheric research, than it is for
broadly-based land remote sensing such as geology or agricultural crop
monitoring.
The meteorological, oceanic and land-oriented "user communities" represent
three groups having almost orders of magnitude differences in size and
complexity.
o The civilian meteorological user community is described as very
small, very specialized, and composed largely of Government(s)
personnel. "There are about 6,000 professional people in this
field in the U.S., and about the same number abroad. There is one
principal U.S. professional society and one major international
organization." Satellites have been in routine use for almost
twenty years. Data products are distributed world-wide on a
routine basis. Data users are largely professional meteoro-
logists and there are customary channels for coordinating tech-
nical information needs. The roles of NOAA, DOD, and NASA are
relatively well defined and under regular review.
o The civilian oceanic user community is described as much more
diverse and difficult to coordinate than the meteorological. For
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oceanic processes and services, there are perhaps tens of
thousands of potential users vs. the thousands in meteorology.
Oceanography is also far behind meteorology in development of
numerical computational programs that record, analyze and dis-
tribute data. In many respects satellite remote sensing to sup-
port oceanic research and services is just beginning.
o The user community for land data represents an altogether dif-
ferent and larger dimension than meteorologic and oceanic. There
are very large numbers of potential and actual users, and appli-
cations, for civil land remote sensing data. Tens of thousands of
diverse civil users have worked largely with Landsat, to date,
and are distributed worldwide throughout all sectors and many
disciplines. Computerized geographically-based information
systems are largely decentralized. Because the applications are
so varied and the users so diffuse, the user requirements defini-
tion process for civil land remote sensing was characterized in
one interview as a "tangled web of technology, users, federal,
legal, and regulatory considerations."
An example of a small, closely-knit, user community was described as the
field of upper atmospheric research. In that case, requirements were said
to have emerged, in the 1960's and gravitated to NASA when scientific
concerns over ozone depletion developed. The concerns led to reviews of
potential ways data could be acquired, with space-borne sensors turning
out to be necessary. NASA then began to develop sensors, etc. The NASA
research role became established, its scientific constituency became
defined, and its congressional mandate was legislated. The "users" of most
of the output of the upper atmosphere research, however, are a relatively
small number of scientists who in turn, depend almost entirely upon NASA-
sponsored and funded activity. These scientists are the user community in
the narrow sense. The nation, or the policy makers who must make decisions
on the basis of the scientific data, represent the user community in the
broader sense.
An example of a more extensive and diffused user community is the geologic
mapping and exploration community. In this case, "users" are distributed
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throughout government, private, and academic groups, but only a relatively
small number of professional geologists regularly use NASA remote sensing
products (largely Landsat) for their experimental or operational applica-
tions. The potential future user community is much larger, but if it
develops it will be an operationally-oriented, rather than research-
oriented community. (See the Appendix for details).
As noted previously, there have been many elaborate functional classifica-
tions developed in studies that have related users, by type or organiza-
tion, to NASA-originated remote sensing applications or possibilities. In
detail, these identify literally hundreds of discrete subject fields--
uses—spanning all sectors, and relate them to specific technological
possibilities for scientific investigation or more routine operational
applications. The studies that we reviewed ranged from the multi-volume
cost benefit studies conducted in the early 1970's, Summer Studies and
Symposiums in the middle 1970's, technical studies supporting systems
designs, and studies such as the interagency Integrated Remote Sensing
System Study (IRS ) conducted in 1978-79. A variety of current study
efforts within NASA and NOAA were also reviewed. From these as well as
from the interviews, it is clear that specific uses of remote sensing
technology have been catalogued in greater detail, and many times more
completely than specific users.
A conclusion drawn from this review is that the number and complexity of
the interrelationships between the uses and users, on the one hand, and
space-borne remote sensing technology on the other, are so great that, to
date, they have defied systematic management. Individual "users" can be
identified as examples in most fields, but there is no agreed means of
expanding that to a concrete understanding of (let alone, routine inter-
action with) the full "user community" in an aggregate or market context,
except for narrowly-focused scientific research or experimentation. The
inability to identify the user communities in some detail is a major
weakness. As one of those interviewed put it: "You can avoid it for a
time, but sooner or later you have to have a user community behind a
program for it to be successful".
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2.4 PROCESSES AND MECHANISMS FOR INTERACTION
Many types of processes and mechanisms for interaction were identified
during the course of the present review. Both in the documents examined
and in discussions with knowledgeable observers, the strengths and weak-
nesses of these tended to be cited rather uniformly. They generally were
grouped according to their duration, in three categories: ad hoc; inter-
mittent; and continuing. No single approach dominated others in terms of
imputed over-all utility — although there were questions concerning the
effectiveness of many. Observations on the various processes and mecha-
nisms for interaction are outlined below.
2.4.1 Ad Hoc
Much of the initial user requirements development in the NASA remote
sensing applications area has been handled through ad hoc approaches. Ad
hoc processes and mechanisms for interaction include specialized large
Studies, Task Forces, one-time Surveys and Symposiums, and various types
of Workshops. The following comments are based on data and observations
encountered in our review:
o Large Studies were rather universally questioned in terms of
whether they ended up being worth the effort. Several observers
were emphatic in their views that large studies should only be
undertaken when a major problem exists that has to be solved.
Then attack that problem and present options and "what ifs."
Provide only limited copies to the person(s) who has to solve the
problem (make a decision). Studies should address action items.
Studies for study sake: never. Too many Studies are just used to
provide a stamp of approval on decisions already made. There are
s
many exhaustive Studies that have box diagrams of all the user
needs, their relation to data and sensors, etc. These Studies are
not processes. They end up on shelves and in file drawers without
follow-up. If Studies are interagency and OMB-involved, then
there is excessive pulling and tugging by participants to control
the results. These Studies do not get used either. Interagency
Studies frequently have useful by-products in terms of people
working together and having eyes opened, but it is rare to have
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any follow-up. The resources marshaled, ad hoc, are dispersed
when the Study is finished, and they are especially difficult to
sustain and coordinate when the Study is lengthy.
o Task Forces are generally convened in the absence of having sys-
tematic processes for handling user requirements. Personnel are
"borrowed" from their regular assignments. The output is gener-
ally a study, or documentation, to support the objective of the
Task Force. USDA, for example, has used Department-wide Task
Forces to address remote sensing requirements. The results
included the "Secretary's Initiative" in 1978 that led to
AgRISTARS. The Task Force catalogued thousands of individual
information needs of USDA, and the remote sensing requirements
related to them, in hierarchical order. It reached agreement on
the seven top information requirements of USDA, in priority order
and worked under senior management. After the Task Force, how-
ever, the people dispersed. While the process helped result in
AgRISTARS with its interagency coordination and management mecha-
nisms, it did not rationalize the processes within USDA. It did
result in the constructive consolidation of information and
requirements for the 4-5 agencies within USDA that were involved.
There is often considerable reluctance to use the Task Force
approach because of the drain on resources it involves and the
uncertainties about effectiveness. Once disbanded, it takes a
major cause to start it up again.
o One-time Surveys and Symposiums may be useful in collecting input
data for user requirements analyses, or for information exchange,
but it is generally quite difficult to organize and follow-
through systematically on the generally large amounts of data
involved. To be effective, considerable care must be taken in
original organization, and in "quality control." Symposiums were
criticized when it was judged that they were convened primarily
for the purpose of ratifying decisions already made. Organiza-
tion of data and reporting of results is generally time-consuming
and frequently is too late to provide support for current deci-
sions. Questionnaires were criticized on the grounds that they
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generally resulted in "wish lists" and that it was very difficult
to get questionnaires to the right people at the right time to be
effective.
Summer Studies. Several observers cited "Summer Studies" as
among the most effective of the ad hoc processes, although they
may differ considerably in focus and scale. One of the examples
of effectiveness was described as the 1969-or-so study that
developed requirements for NASA's geodetic satellite program.
The key to the process was selection of a well regarded, indepen-
dent geophysicist to head the study. He canvassed and selected
participants. NASA arranged and facilitated. One week was on
problem definition, and one week was on proposed approaches to
solutions. The output of the study became an input to NASA in
formulating a research program that was said to still carry
through today.
Another example, but with less clear effectiveness, was the 1974
Snowmass, Colorado, Summer Study, "Practical Applications of
Space Systems," conducted at NASA request by the Space Applica-
tions Board, Assembly of Engineering, of the National Academy of
Sciences. The Study's goal was to involve a representative group
of users and potential users, organized in nine panels covering
different application areas, in an intensive two-week study to
define user needs that might be met by information or services
derived from satellites. It made a number of recommendations
dealing with user needs, with technology, and with institutional
arrangements. One of its conclusions was that "institutional
arrangements are inadequate for identifying the needs of poten-
tial users so as to provide direct and consistent guidance to
technologists and the developers of space systems." Without
evaluating it in detail, this type of study illustrates a mecha-
nism for crystallizing widely-based information in a brief time,
but also the problems of follow-up action on its findings, which
were said to be limited.
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o Workshops generally were judged to be of value when they involved
small groups of experts who were convened to address relatively
well and narrowly defined topics. They were criticized when
perceived as "y1all come" exercises primarily to marshal support
for predetermined conclusions. For user requirements develop-
ment, the principal problems were sponsorship, selection of par-
ticipants, and the administrative overhead that accompanies the
organization, coordination, and reporting of the results. "It is
common practice for NASA to sponsor workshops. Top management
from participating organizations is invited, but generally they
have to pick 2nd and 3rd level people to represent the agency.
Participants have a good 3-4 day interaction, but not the key
decision makers who get a second or third hand account."
Conclusion; The utility of ad hoc processes and mechanisms for interaction
depends heavily on the clarity and focus of the objectives, the level of
participation, the management competence and the soundness of the methods
selected. When any of these conditions are absent, the ad hoc processes
are ineffective. Ad hoc approaches are, by definition, difficult to sus-
tain and are administratively complicated.
2.4.2 Intermittent
i
Intermittent mechanisms for user requirements development are those that
are cyclical, or are repetitive parts of continuing broader programs. They
include cooperative investigations, the basic budget and programming
cycle, and periodic requests and reports.
o Cooperative Investigations, that involve interaction and shared
responsibilities between NASA technical programs and users pro-
vide a basis for development and refinement of user requirements.
They have the advantage of being done in a setting that permits
direct interaction between the "hands-on" user and NASA program
personnel. They range from APT's (Applications Pilot Test) and
ASVT's (Application System Verification and Transfer) in differ-
ent sectors and subjects, to the wide range of Principal Investi-
gators conducting joint research in a number of fields. These
provide for periodic interaction between NASA and users for the
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duration of the investigations, which frequently last several
years. They are generally problem-specific, and cover relatively
narrow topics, individually. As a group, at any one time, they
consist of projects that are in vastly different stages of
developmental analysis. These investigations, collectively,
represent a rich source of requirements-related data, but are not
uniformly directed to that objective. There was a common com-
plaint concerning NASA's "Principal Investigtor" method of con-
ducting research, on the grounds that the process generally
offered too little visibility to outsiders, and the results were
very slow to come out.
o The Budget and Programming Cycle obviously represents a regular
and primary mechanism for review of user requirements as part of
the program planning and justification process. NASA offices
marshal and review user needs data during this process. A common
complaint regarding requirements was that the budget process
itself, drives NASA regularly toward technically glamorous and
advanced projects at the expense of more prosaic projects that,
nevertheless, were valuable to external users. Some users felt,
for example, that views on user requirements were solicited by
NASA only at budget time, and then only as part of a search for
program justification data. "Users needs" were secondary. In
this view, the user requirements process was not nearly as
responsive to user needs, as it could be with a different focus.
In the view of some, not surprisingly, it was felt that the OMB
had become the senior user requirements entity in the government
in the sense that user needs frequently were decided at that
point. Most users felt they were totally isolated from those
processes.
o Periodic Requests and Reports such as the RTOPS or 5- and 10-year
planning documents provide a basis for updating and refining data
on user requirements, but the RTOP is generally focused on rela-
tively specific needs in relation to identified technology, and
the long range planning documents present user data in highly
summarized form. There was rather uniform questioning of the
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practical effect that either series had on the development of
user requirements, as such, and a belief that statements of user
needs were inevitably tailored primarily to support the proposed
technical programs. In that sense, the processes involve much
more "technology push" than "user requirements pull."
Conclusion: The utility of the intermittent processes and mechanisms for
interaction depends on having jointly defined interests, timeliness, and
soundness of the data being developed. There needs to be a recognized user
requirements development function and a greater opportunity for inter-
action involved for those approaches to be effective in the user require-
ments definition area.
2.4.3 Continuing
There are a variety of processes and mechanisms for interaction that
operate on a continuing basis, but they are largely advisory. They include
Advisory Committees (with their subordinate Subcommittee's, Working
Groups, Panels, etc.); Interagency and multisector Boards; Academies,
Foundations, and Councils; and Professional and Scientific Associations.
Last, but not least in this category, are personal contacts.
o Advisory Committees and their subordinate elements were, on-the-
whole, viewed with some skepticism, with questions raised as to
whether they were, in fact, effective or useful. The problems
most often cited were that people cannot open up with their real
views, there generally are too many people involved, and the
setting is too artificial. The participants are likely to
"assert" requirements. (The higher the advisory group, the
larger the egos.) Because they are "advisory", they do not come
to grips with issues in the same way as the decision-makers who
have to be responsible for the consequences of the actions they
take. A frequent criticism was that members of Advisory Commit-
tees inherently had strong incentives to tell NASA managers what
they wanted to hear. On the other hand, it was acknowledged that
they represent a means of regular interaction with senior people
who are external to NASA and, generally, the government. Conti-
nuity is often provided through supporting staff elements, but
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these rarely have an independent role in development of user
requirements data.
It was the general perception of those interviewed that NASA
advisory bodies were too heavily weighted toward scientific/
academic personnel who were unable to represent effectively the
interests of more operationally-oriented users. As larger role
was encouraged for the latter, including provision for continuing
interaction among federal government agencies. Although advisory
bodies provide a source of continuing refinement of guidance on
aspects of the user requirements they tend also to work primarily
on agendas, and with information, developed by the NASA program/
project managers. The advisory group personnel are rarely avail-
able to provide sustained, independent inputs to the NASA plan-
ning process.
At the national level, there are many formal advisory bodies such
as the National Advisory Committee on Oceans and Atmosphere
(NACOA), the Water Resources Council, the National Research
Council of the Academy of Sciences, etc. They have formal char-
ters, prestigious memberships in their fields, and permanent
staffs to support the discharge of their advisory functions. In
the final analysis, however, these bodies were perceived to
almost always lack clout. By definition, they are advisory, with
distributed responsibilities and they cannot push through con-
troversial actions. There are too many ways to block or veto.
Statements of national level requirements by Advisory Committees
provide support to programs, but they rarely drive programs.
Interagency Coordinating Boards and Committees There are a
variety of mechanisms to coordinate interagency or intersector
requirements in conjunction with other activities. The Space
Science Board of the Academy of Sciences was cited as an example
of an effective mechanism for the scientific R&D community to
identify and order its requirements. It involves high-level
Panels that think far-sightedly regarding earth sciences and
devise experiments. Key questions in advancing sciences are
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framed through the Academy. Panels were said to have a generally
good mix of people, with "authorities" identified by peers. It
was said to be an appropriate group to support NASA regarding
science needs. At the level of applied "operational" user needs,
there are no equivalent mechanisms. The "Program Board" for land
remote sensing, directed to be formed by PD-54, has not func-
tioned to date, and was cited as an example of the problems
encountered in establishing formal interagency machinery for co-
ordination of policy and for information exchange. Bureaucratic
interests, and difficulties even in defining and coordinating a
charter are inevitable and, controlled in important respects by
elements (such as OMB) that are external to the responsible
agency (NOAA).
For years, there was a federal interagency coordinating mechanism
for civil remote sensing, the ICCERSP (Interagency Coordinating
Committee for Earth Remote Sensing Programs). It had a charter,
minutes, etc., and was chaired by NASA with senior representa-
tives from throughout the federal government. It examined civil
applications satellite programs, had hundreds of meetings,
developed numerous large papers, but "decisions were always made
in small select groups." ICCERSP was allowed to die in con-
junction with the Carter Administration Space Policy Reviews,
conducted by the Policy Review Committee (Space), and no sub-
sequent mechanism has replaced it at the senior SES level. The
present "Cabinet Council" mechanism provides for interagency
policy review of issues, and for coordination, but it appears to
be largely ad hoc in its approach, and largely controlled by
central (Executive Office) staff elements.
Scientific and Professional Associations provide means for the
extensive interchange of a vast range of information, including
exchanges of data on user needs. There have been various pro-
posals to establish relatively formal mechanisms, under the aegis
of professional/technical associations, to define and order
requirements in these fields. The idea was to capture the profes-
sional knowledge and expertise embodied in the association and
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use it to assist NASA in coordinating and defining requirements.
Such proposals have never developed to fruition. NASA regularly
supports conventions, symposiums, etc. conducted by Associations
in relevant fields. Virtually all of the persons interviewed
regarded these as necessary and valuable sources of information,
technical stimulation, and professional contact. At the same
time, there was criticism of the in-bred outlook frequently
involved, the large numbers of associations, and the level of
demands on NASA personnel, as well as the lengthy interval
between preparation of research work and its publication. There
was also the repeated statement that "operationally significant
findings" are almost never published in professional journals,
with the result that it is very difficult to audit progress in
operational applications, except by inference or through personal
contact.
Personal Contacts were almost universally regarded as one of the
most important mechanisms in the process of developing user
requirements data. Some relatively senior people thought that
personal contacts were the user requirements process, in the
sense that a combination of formal and informal contacts was
regarded as the only effective method with sufficient flexibility
and breadth to develop a good insight into the range of interests
from user needs on the one hand to technical responses on the
other. In this view, the project or program manager would make
requirements related decisions largely on the basis of inputs
from the network of personal contacts in the field involved. The
most conmonly cited criticism of this process was that require-
ments too often were formulated by an "old boy" network or a "cozy
club" of self-interested people that excluded the interests of
many users. Interested parties external to the in-group were
largely in the dark and had no means of interaction. Critics
argued for more orderly and more broadly-based processes. It
seemed evident, particularly in the review of the geologic map-
ping and domestic crop production user requirements processes,
that the participants in these processes relied heavily on the
informal network of personal contacts among the relatively small
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numbers of professionals who were performing the leading edge
research on applications.
Conclusion: The utility of the continuing mechanisms and processes for
interaction and the validity of the data developed through these means
depends upon representative participation, defined roles for the partici-
pants, and the presence of incentives to identify and sharpen user require-
ments as an ongoing part of the total planning and programming process.
Overall, it is clear that there are many more types of processes and
mechanisms available than are germane to individual disciplines or prob-
lems. There was little or no consistency in the evaluation of the poten-
tial utility of the different approaches, except the common view that some
(undefined) small number of mechanisms should be employed together in
evolving improved user requirements processes, and that the key ingredient
for effectiveness is that they play well together. The implication of this
is that mechanisms need to be chosen carefully with an eye both to their
immediate function and to their compatibility and relationship to other
mechanisms involved with other stages of the total process.
2.5 STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES
A number of strengths and weaknesses in the current user requirements
processes surfaced consistently in the course of our review, both from
analysis and during the interviews that were conducted. The most fre-
quently cited are summarized briefly in the following paragraphs. Any
evolving user requirements process should attempt to preserve and enlarge
on the strengths as well as alleviate weaknesses. The strengths and weak-
nesses, in many respects, reflect perceptions of the overall thrust of
NASA activity broadly, including the remote sensing area, rather than
being uniquely related to the user requirements process. They have a
significant bearing, however, on the handling of user requirements.
2.5.1 Strengths
There were six characteristics that were most frequently cited as
strengths in NASA's approach to the user requirements process.
o Technical Talent. There was a uniform view that NASA's greatest
strength was in its "superb collection of technical talent."
This talent had been marshaled, of course, for many purposes
beyond the user requirements process, but it provided at the same
time a ready access to data and a rich reservoir of expertise when
evaluating technical aspects of the user requirements. Pre-
serving this pool of talent as a national resource and keeping it
challenged, was cited as a major problem.
o "Can Do" Innovative Approaches. The mission and activities of
' NASA in the past has engendered a tradition of "can do" innovative
approaches to problems. External users found this especially
valuable in their efforts to find technical solutions to some of
their problems, and to relate new technology to their information
needs.
o Structured Review Processes. Because of its scientific and
engineering focus, as well as the innovative nature and magnitude
of some of its programs, an internal review process has evolved
that includes elements outside of the direct management chain,
including advisory bodies external to NASA. The strength of this
is that it broadens visibility and marshals significant expertise
and external opinion in the "normal" course of program or project
review. This was sometimes cited as a weakness on the grounds
that the processes unduly diluted management responsibility.
When the process focused on substance (vs. form), however, it was
viewed by external agencies as a significant NASA strength.
o Response to Concretely Focused Requirements. NASA's organiza-
tion, processes, and overall management approach were character-
ized as geared-to, and strongest for highly concrete activities
like Apollo ("land a man on the moon, and return him safely"), the
planetary probes, and other scientific programs with concretely-
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defined objectives. In these programs the "requirements" were
established in the earliest stages and the focus and organization
of subsequent activity became directed primarily toward execu-
tion. This includes a variety of R&D requirements.
o Professional Contacts. The NASA scientific and technical specia-
lists engaged in remote sensing programs across the various dis-
ciplines were characterized as very good at maintaining informal
professional contact with colleagues in other organizations and
sectors. The openness of the NASA activities allows for easy
access and information exchange, and the tradition of profes-
sional interaction through Associations and publication of find-
ings resulted in the existence of informal networks of contacts
that the participants relied on for primary information exchange.
NASA also has had a policy that encouraged NASA support to the
activities of the professional Associations.
o Responsiveness to External Requests. As a generalization, NASA
was characterized as being unusually responsive to external
requests or initiatives for supporting research or experimenta-
tion in remote sensing. In part, this was said to be a reflection
of NASA's search for constituents, or "for technology in search
of a mission." Regardless of imputed motivation, observers con-
sistently cited as a NASA strength, the willingness and respon-
siveness of its personnel to attempt to assist external organiza-
tions in meeting needs that they identified.
2.5.2 Weaknesses
There were seven examples of weaknesses in the user requirements processes
that were cited most frequently. Some of these affected the overall
ability to capitalize on the strengths, above.
o Channels for Interaction. There are few established channels for
interaction between users and the various technical specialists
in NASA who are attempting to act on the information needs that
they perceive these users to have. As a result,- there is much
unevenness in the way interaction is handled among components and
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disciplines and uncertainty on the part of many users (and NASA
personnel) as to the channels to use. Trial and error is the
frequent inefficient outcome. The absence of established chan-
nels is a disincentive to interaction because of the time and
energy sometimes involved just in "getting through to the right
place."
o Planning Information. There is little routine exchange of timely
planning information between users and NASA, especially in the
broader programs such as land remote sensing. There are few mech-
anisms for such an exchange. As a result, users frequently learn
of changes in NASA planning too late to be effective in com-
municating the user requirements implications, and users also at
times incorporate NASA-generated data in their planned applica-
tions in ways that are inconsistent with longer range NASA plan-
ning. Lack of access to accurate, timely, planning data was cited
frequently as a major stumbling block to effective external plan-
ning and interaction. Decisions on budgets dominated the other
aspects of the planning processes.
o Ambiguous Roles. An almost universally cited problem by the
external (and many internal) observers interviewed was that NASA
turns out to be difficult to work with on user requirements mat-
ters because of ambiguous roles, authorities and responsibilities
among its components. It was difficult to know where to go or to
know who was in charge. The Field Centers like JSC, ARC, GSFC
were perceived to have sometimes overlapping responsibilities and
various areas of technical specialization, while HQs was still
different. They appeared to outsiders like separate kingdoms.
As a result, users frequently felt they were unable to interact
effectively. There was a perception that the NASA organizational
form to some extent deliberately limited clear lines of manage-
ment responsibility ("creative competition"), but it is
especially difficult for user communities to know where to commu-
nicate when management is diffuse. A similar ambiguity existed
over R&D vs. "operational" roles for NASA activity, and over the
interagency roles of NASA and NOAA particularly in the field of
land remote sensing.
o Stages in User Requirements Processes. There are inconsistent
approaches to the different stages of the user requirements pro-
cess, and no accepted definitions, with the result that it is
difficult to make cross-program comparisons, to aggregate the
user requirements from different programs or disciplines, or to
evaluate routinely the relationship of technology developed
against one set of user needs in satisfying requirements in
another.
o Ad Hoc Studies. A regularly cited weakness of the current pro-
cesses was said to be the heavy reliance on ad hoc studies that
absorb large resources and cannot be sustained. These studies
were also critized on the ground that there was rarely extensive
circulation of results or any follow-up. As a result, even when
effective data and conclusions were generated initially, their
credibility and perceived relevance decayed rapidly with changing
circumstances, and participating organizations became faced with
the prospect of having to generate still another ad hoc study.
o Inconsistent National Policy. One of the most frequently cited
problems with the user requirements processes was that incon-
sistent national policy and goals impeded effective planning and
user commitments. There was broad recognition and agreement that
national policy involves complex issues, and that economic con-
straints may at times impede programs that are otherwise worth-
while. It was simply stated as a fact, that inconsistent policies
or follow-through at the national level have seriously impeded
the development of effective user-NASA interaction at the program
or discipline level. Without a stable policy setting, it was
argued that users were unable to organize or channel their needs
or resources effectively.
o Differences in Perspective. There were a variety of problems
frequently cited in the interviews, that reflected differences in
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perspective by users and NASA personnel. We were struck regu-
larly by the absence of direct knowledge of each others' views,
motivations and programs, that led to the perceptions. Collec-
tively, the fact of these differences represented a major weak-
ness in the user requirements process that should be overcome.
Examples that were frequently cited were the following: From
users: "NASA doesn't listen, it 's programs are technology
driven"; From NASA: "users don't know their own needs"; From
users: "NASA planning is driven by the budget process -- bigger
is better"; From both: "User planning is driven by the status quo
— better safe than sorry"; From users: "NASA buys its own
constituencies." Almost all of those interviewed were familiar
with these views and felt that these statements were accurate as
reflections of how NASA and users viewed each other. On review,
we found statements like these frequently to contain kernels of
truth, but they also appeared to be inaccurate or unfair in a
number of specific instances. They reflected overall the diffi-
culties of maintaining accurate perceptions in the absence of
established methods for routine communication and interaction.
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3.0 EVALUATION
3.0 EVALUATION
3.1 ALTERNATIVE MECHANISMS
There are many alternative-mechanisms that are candidates for considera-
tion as elements around which the user requirements processes should be
organized. The focus of our evaluation has been on attempting to identify
alternatives that sustain strengths, alleviate weaknesses, maximize appli-
cation to multiple problems, and simplify management cognizance.
Many of those interviewed had their own, sometimes strong, views on the
elements that should be embodied in an effective user requirements pro-
cess. Many of these were common. Collectively, however, they represented a
relatively broad range of opinion and differing points of emphasis. Some
of the alternatives are outlined below, with the "flavor" of the proponents
views preserved in some cases. An evaluation is made of each alternative.
3.1.1 Use of "Integrators"
A number of persons thought that "integrators" were the key to having an
effective process. In this view, there is a continuing problem for the
various organizations involved (NASA and users) to maintain contact with
"user requirements" in an authoritative way. User requirements, in turn,
are crucial. Without them being established soundly, and authoritatively,
programs sooner or later get into trouble.
Definitions and a recognition of the steps involved are important. The
"user requirements process" must start at the top with user-oriented ob-
jectives; then, it must define system requirements that meet those objec-
tives; and the third step is to demonstrate that the requirements achieve
the objectives.
Development of an effective interface between users and satellite system
developers is a very tough problem. The users themselves cannot bridge the
technology gap. On the other hand, the simple aggregation of all users
needs represents an unrealistic statement of requirements. The technology
and the needs must come together in relation to what is really possible.
The objective of the user requirements process must be to provide a sound,
realistic basis for establishing the characteristics that are, or will be,
40
embodied in a satellite system design, including ground processing and
dissemination criteria.
The approach to such requirements is not very disciplined today. For one
thing, users do not know what they need to, or can, have from satellite
remote sensing, in terms of how to make better forecasts or make better
decisions. It can be avoided for a time, but sooner or later, a user
community must be behind a program for it to be successful. To date,
defining the objectives for many programs has been a "lot of arm waving."
The Landsat program, for example, was commonly perceived as having done
little in defining what needs to be done.
"The trick in the business is to find those specially gifted people who are
able to bridge the gap between the users and technologists: Integrators,
who look both ways." The Landsat community, again, is described as very
large, with probably 20,000+ direct users, some 1,000+ professional
papers, alone, per year, etc. The necessary ingredient in developing an
effective user requirements process, under these circumstances, is to find
those key people who can operate across the span of these communities.
They are few in number, but they exist, and can be identified. Then the
task is to organize them.
A systematic Working Group of integrators ("key" users) should be formed
that is then made intimately involved in the decision making process. This
general approach should be used in all programs. The Working Group should
be established formally to assure continuity and effectiveness, and it
would need to have some full-time staff support to capitalize on the
expertise of its members.
EVALUATION: Accurate perception of problems; strong in consolidating
expert opinion; weak to challenge of "old boy" net; organizational place-
ment and management uncertain.
3.1.2 Senior Coordinating Committee
In this view, one of the most important needs is to have an identified
federal government vehicle for regular communication. The need is for
senior people to be talking to each other on a regular basis, with the
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members pegged at the top level of the Senior Executive Service (SES),
perhaps edging into some political appointees. The level would be similar
to the former ICCERSP. Such a committee would need to be able to carry
weight with OMB and Congressional Staffs. There probably should be two
kinds: one involving the scientific community, looking at "blue skies"
aspects of key interest to NASA in terms of R&D. The second would be for
"operational" users, looking at the interests that they have in NASA acti-
vities in many fields.
It is important to be realistic about what can be accomplished through a
federal broadly-based interagency coordinating group.
o As a minimum such a group would provide a mechanism for regular,
routine, exchange of information and a channel through which a
variety of interests could be communicated.
o To be effective, any interagency mechanism should have top-level
backing from the participating organizations, and have some full
time staff support to be able to provide useful service to these
organizations.
o It would be more effective for NASA if an external organization
chaired such groups. An external scientist, for the scientific
group, and someone with a user-orientation for the other. The
"Program Board" directed by PD-54 has some elements of the latter
(operational) type committee, but it has not functioned effec-
tively to date.
o Representation is a difficult problem to deal with..."who speaks
for a Department...?" Each major Department or Agency is indepen-
dent and often has a number of Bureaus, Services, Agencies, etc.
that are themselves largely independent with differing interests
and relationships. Remote sensing interests are often difficult
to identify and aggregate because the output of civil remote
sensing systems are invariably complementary to conventional
sources of data for most user programs including even scientific.
EVALUATION: Fills a current gap; strong in forming the basis for routine
communications; weak in clout ("committee") and absence of non-federal
interests; will take time to be effective.
3.1.3 Mission Definition Office
In this view, it is very important to define "user requirements." Their
main role should be to support definition of space systems that are respon-
sive to user information needs. It is important to decide at the outset
whether the objective is scientific research, experimental, operational,
or some combination. It is also important to decide who is responsible for
what.
o The wrong approach is to design the system first, and then look for
uses, "but that has been the practice". In such cases, the
requirements process is poorly carried out because the structure
is already constrained. People are trying to get answers
(requirements) on what they are prepared to do already.
o NASA should have a requirements process rather than a series of
one-time events. The "big bang" approach to requirements doesn't
work. The reasons for the absence of a process are complex, but
apparently stem from the larger processes of developing satel-
lites, with spasmodic needs for data, and short deadlines. The
tendency is to use a "wise man" process. It's a practical approach
at the time, but falls short in the crunch. The requirements are
not believed externally.
o A major weakness is that responsibility is diffused in NASA. It
would be useful to have a Mission Definition Office responsible
for ongoing consolidation and exchange of data on user needs and
technological possibilities. The lack of clear cut responsib-
ilities or stable requirements today, is a major demotivator for
almost everyone involved.
i
o There is a need for persons defining requirements who have the
broad view of user needs and applications. (Similar to "inte-
grators"). Users are generally not prepared, or competent, to
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answer technically-oriented questions about their needs. "There
should be a process with translators who can relate the informa-
tion needs of the users to the measurements that can be made via
remote sensing. Then, iterate with the builders of the space
systems. The builders can define the limits. But it must be a
continuous, reiterative process."
A number of observers were struck by the extent of ambivalence within NASA
on where to lodge responsibility. "Creative competition, has its place,
but within limits."
\
In this view, the ambivalence on responsibility and objectives today leads
to justifying systems in every possible way: R&D and operational. At the
same time, "nothing is more destructive in system and program design than
uncertainty and repeated changes in the requirements. There are many
examples. Guidance today is fragmented and largely undocumented. A
Mission Definition Office, properly functioning, would provide stability
and continuity."
o The user requirements responsibility should not be placed in the
Field Centers, "because they would simply undercut each other."
Therefore, this responsibility should be lodged in NASA HQ, some-
where. ("Even when there is good work at one of the Centers it is
common for it to be distrusted by the other centers and by HQ.") In
any case, the user requirements definition function should be in a
separate office that can be "objective."
o The approach would be to develop a specialized "requirements"
focus through teams that would take on the tasks of developing
data for long range planning (vertical), and interacting with
user communities (horizontal). It should attempt to have a
"market" outlook. It would be important to have a non-hostile,
non-accusatory (lots lately) environment. The Office role would
be not to fix blame, but to solve problems. It would be used as a
creative, independent arm providing requirements-related guid-
ance. Rotating tours could be used for staffing. It would need a
careful charter dealing with how it responds and to whom. A key
element, of course, would be the personalities involved. Field
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Centers would end up as assigned lead centers on various pro-
grams.
EVALUATION: Focuses organizational responsibility; strong in consoli-
dating requirements and technical data, and independent guidance "objec-
tive"; weak in the large number and complexity of user interfaces and
potential to usurp line functions; could quickly improve and rationalize
present data.
3.1.4 Clarify National Level Policy and Interagency Roles
This view was expressed by a number of those interviewed. It represents
some of the perceptions of those who do not make policy, but are affected
by it in their day-to-day management. In this view, the key to effective
user requirements processes lies in the policy arena. The problem today is
that there is no comparable commitment in space to man-on-the-moon. Apollo
was a ten year program with national support: public, executive, congres-
sional. Continuity was guaranteed once underway. Today, programs are
year-to-year and do not have the psychological motivation of the earlier
programs. There are no broad national space objectives within which pro-
grams can be executed. National "policy" has words, but actions deny them.
PD-54 is "inoperative".
Who is the "user"? At the highest level, the nation is the user. At that
level, space activities should still be approached broadly. The national
objective should be to compete internationally and contribute to produc-
tivity domestically.
When it comes down to it, the key to the user requirements process is
almost always the big "P", Politics and constituencies.
The political environment is key. Without political, highest-level, sup-
port, programs cannot function. It is more than planning, although good
planning is essential to getting political support. The national deci-
sions must be made first, with agreement on the policy approach. For
example, balance of payments, international food/crop balances, energy
resources, fishing, etc. Options must be considered and decisions made
that will stick.
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o In this context, the NASA user requirements process should focus
on the following: "How can NASA take advantage of the needs of
external agencies, and orchestrate programs that are responsive to
those needs and draw support from the constituencies that these
agencies have?"
o The impetus has to come from or be integrally supported by, other
agencies dealing with agriculture, minerals, oceans, etc.
o How to make the best use of agencies and people in the context of
public and private sectors, and politics, is the question. Unless
these aspects are rationalized, the user requirements processes,
and the programs they support, cannot be effective.
When considering the user requirements process below the national level,
in the interagency context, it should jiot be NASA's responsibility to find
out user's needs. Rather, it should be user agencies responsibility to
communicate their needs to NASA.
o The user agencies have constituencies that they serve, and legis-
lated functions. NASA's constituency should be the user agencies.
o The federal agencies with their missions, interface with the
"ultimate" users. These agencies are therefore, in the best posi-
tion to know what's needed. NASA should capitalize on these rela-
tionships. The user communities are too broad and diverse for an
effective one-on-one NASA-user interface. There is a need for
filtering and ordering, with clearly defined responsibilites.
o The delegation of user requirements development to external agen-
cies creates problems, too, because intermediate agencies are not
always attuned, which places NASA in the position of potentially
having to work through organizations that have not developed good
user interaction or that are not fully respected by the users. But
there aren't good alternatives, because NASA cannot do it alone.
NASA must focus on strengthening and supporting the other agen-
ci es.
It is important to recognize that there are ways to attack many problems
other than by space remote sensing. "Remote sensing is like watching
someone bleed to death...unless you know where to apply the tourniquet you
won't get the right results..." The role of space remote sensing is two-
fold:
o To catalogue natural and man-made features, and to monitor changes
that are taking place; and,
o To identify anomolies that require more intense examination by
remote sensing or other means.
To be responsive, NASA's role has to be focused on two somewhat different
objectives:
o Continued research, without direct regard for users,
o Service needs identified by other agencies and users.
EVALUATION: Focuses on importance of national policy; strong in directing
energy to first things first, and defining NASA's constituents (other
agncies); weak in defining "how" to proceed and in elaborating instru-
mentalities; pragmatic.
3.1.5 Private Sector Market Approach
In this view, the requirements definition process must come back to the
classic market framework. The ground rules should be that a "requirement"
hasn't been defined until a user has been identified who is willing to pay
for the eventual product. A major difficulty today is that the market
place is artificial. The federal government picks up the tab. The "true"
worth of space remote sensing products are therefore difficult to estab-
lish. The total market, in turn, includes not only government agencies but
also the other sectors, and is both domestic and foreign. To be effective,
the user requirements process needs to take account of the aggregate
market.
A problem is that the Government cannot easily treat narrow interests. The
Government is set up to meet broad needs. A Private firm can look as
narrowly as it wants. In the aggregate, the latter results in servicing a
much broader total market.
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Industry has to define requirements very carefully because the governing
element is the ability to pay. The Government is poorest at defining
requirements because ability to pay doesn't come into play to the extent it
does for commercial activities. The Government is also generally poor at
marketing, because it has no incentive to develop a market in the context
of selling and evolving products.
o A private owner needs to have end-to-end control to deliver speci-
fic products against contracts, or go out of business.
o The Government does not go out of business if it fails to deliver.
In many instances it provides its products/services without
charges.
In this view, NASA has a legislated mandate for research, but all such
research, except some basic, should be connected with defined "opera-
tional" demand. In a first-order sense, NASA's biggest customers should be
agencies like DMA, CIA, BLM, etc. If a corporation were the owner/operator
of the civil land remote sensing system, for example, its life blood would
be in determining user needs (requirements) and selling products to custo-
mers.
NASA is a poor marketeer, for many of the reasons cited above. "One of the
problems is how to take the pulse of the user agencies in the federal
sector that make up a sizeable part of potential demand. At present, USDA
represents no one but USDA; USDI represents no one but USDI; etc. These
agencies may have opposing interests in various NASA programs or pro-
posals." In the past "the NASA mentality was to decide how to use tech-
nology, and proceed regardless of users' views. NASA program survival now
dictates that it listen more closely."
While it will be very difficult for NASA to approach the user requirements
process as though NASA were a private firm, it should, nevertheless, orga-
nize these processes in ways that take the private market-oriented outlook
directly into account, including explicit recognition of the importance of
"operational" users interests as the starting point, even for research
activities. No single mechanism is likely to be optimum. It is important
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to define objectives in terms of their value to users in a cost-oriented
context.
EVALUATION: Is consistent with emerging national-level policy on private
sector approaches; strong in identifying forcing functions; weak in
defining modalities; difficult to separate "requirements" from broader
issues of private sector ownership/operations.
3.1.6 Multi-Level Iteration
In this view, is is very important to handle requirements definition sys-
tematically, and the starting point on requirements definition should be
at the aggregate national level. Start at the top, with the hierarchy of
information needed to make decisions, and move to the supporting substruc-
ture needed to define two aspects:
o The problems that need to be attacked.
o The information required for these purposes.
If information can come from remote sensing, it then needs to be defined in
terms of scales, accuracies, formats and types of data involved. Down to
that level of specification it is not necessary to have remote sensing
specialists.
It is first of all important to understand the objectives of the users.
The point is that users needs do not necessarily match NASA engineers'
views of these. There are a number of discrete stages in the process of
moving from a statement of user needs to the ultimate translation of these
into a form usable for technical system designs responsive to the needs.
For NASA to do its job, it must know fully the data/information processes
of the major user fields. Then smart people can begin to bridge needs and
technology. NASA typically has not done well in defining the remote
sensing data needs (scales, accuracies, formats, types) that allow
measurement requirements (spatial resolution, temporal resolution, spec-
tral resolution, etc.) to be defined. Data requirements are confused with
measurements.
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It is very important to understand the upper end of the requirements
spectrum...the national problem. Beginning at that level, the multi-level
iteration approach would convene relevant people at the various levels,
work out the requirements, and write a report at each stage that would be
an input to the next stage. A senior NASA person would follow the process
all the way through, producing the reports, circulating the critiques,
etc. The overall sequence would take a long time to cycle, but there are
no short-term fixes.
o The first step would involve working the upper end of major
national problems...energy, food, minerals, etc., with a few
people, to identify the problems of highest potential return and
importance. This would involve Assistant Secretary, Chief Scien-
tist, V P ' s of exploration, level persons to identify and bound the
problems. No remote sensing people.
o The next step would be at the management planning level involving
some remote sensing people. This step would decide data needs, and
the subset of these that can be attacked via remote sensing.
o The next step is to work with technically skilled people to define
measurements data.
o The final steps involve the range of considerations and specifica-
tions that accompany development and operation of a space system
and processing and disseminating its acquired data.
o Throughout, there would need to be a recognition of the complexity
of this process.
For the first step, it would be useful to have one-on-one pre-discussions
at the Associate Administrator level, then a letter outlining desired
participation and objectives.
Throughout the process, one level of iteration should have an output that
identifies and outines the interaction needed at the next level.
At all stages of a phased user requirements process, the approach should be
to develop a strawman, representing the best thinking and documentation
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available, before convening people to interact. Never group-grope on
these issues. The function of the interaction should be to test the
validate and modify the strawman. Then coordinate and evaluate. The
overall objective would be to evolve a stable and authoritative body of
user requirements documentation through the different stages, that would
be available to a wide range of interested parties externally, and be
useful for program review and justification internally.
A variation of the foregoing approach would be to provide for a continuing
iteration through the various stages via permanently established user-
oriented Panels, for the various disciplines, that would be responsible
for reviewing the requirements periodically.
EVALUATION: Thorough and systematic; strong in detailed recognition and
treatment of the multiple stages involved; weak in the complexity and
administrative difficulty of sustaining the full process; would need sub-
stantial support and continuity of direction to be authoritative.
3.1.7 Continue Current Mechanisms
Throughout the present review it was found that the characterization of the
user requirements process that was outlined by the NASA sponsoring organi-
zation at the beginning (p.l) was largely accurate. This was true, both in
terms of the way in which the processes were perceived by those involved,
and also the way they actually operated, based on analysis of the data
developed in our review. In most instances, those who supported continua-
tion of the current approach viewed it as the best that could be done under
the complex combination of circumstances that NASA faced. The current
mechanism, in their view, struck a practical balance among all of the
conflicting forces involved.
The current mechanism lodges responsibility for the technical development
of the user requirements at the Division level with individual program
managers for various disciplines. In this view, the process works within a
hierarchical framework. The NASA Administrator defines policy, programs,
etc., broadly. The Associate Administrator (Office) then translates these
into program guidance. Finally, the HQ Divisions activate the individual
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programs in conjunction with the Field Centers where the principal tech-
nical expertise resides. In theory, HQ is the source of policy guidelines.
Within this framework, the HQ program Directors have the nominal responsi-
bility to identify and define the user requirements and associated
measurements, and to be the principal NASA interface with "users." Project
review with the centers takes place at NASA HQ, but "it does not generally
represent an exchange of data on user needs, etc. The principal inter-
acting mechanisms are at the Office level, not really at the program
manager's level." Field center personnel interact with various "users"
regularly in connection with specific investigations, but otherwise it is
at their own initiative, not because they have assigned responsibilities
to develop user requirements, as such. There are, of course, exceptions to
this generalization.
A simplified diagram of the basic mechanism used today is shown in
Figure 3.
In this approach, there is no set way of defining the user requirements and
acting on them. The processes are ad hoc and adjusted to circumstances.
In each of the discipline areas, the NASA program directors maintain cogni-
zance over user requirements in the relevant subjects, and translate these
into the forms needed to support program responses when they seem appro-
priate. The "user requirements processes" are embedded in the program
development and reviews that are part of the budget cycle. At the senior
level, the Associate Administrator is the ultimate authority on the "user
needs" and the research or other objectives that the programs should
attack.
Individually, each Program Director has considerable latitude in choosing
the approaches to be used for a program. The development of user require-
ments data, and user involvement, are also by methods and techniques
largely of the Director's choosing. Each is tailored to the programs
involved and the management philosophy and outlook of the Program
Director. This approach allows the Program Director maximum flexibility
in selecting and shaping the mechanisms to be employed, and it allows
exercise of initiative. It may, or may not, fit well with the approaches
selected by Program Directors in other fields.
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EVALUATION: Handles user requirements matters on an "as needed" basis;
strong in management flexibility and exercise of initiative; weak in
external credibility, in its singular dependence on key people, and in its
utility in supporting cross program evaluations; a stand pat approach.
3.2 ELEMENTS OF AN OPTIMUM PROCESS
We have attempted, in this section, to identify the elements of an optimum
user requirements process, and to define the conditions that are necessary
for the processes to evolve from today's largely ad hoc practices into an
increasingly coherent and responsive system. Even a cursory review of
alternative mechanisms, singly or in combination as in the previous sec-
tion, shows that there are many different approaches and points of empha-
sis. Clearly, no single mechanism is likely to be optimum for all
important considerations. In an attempt to integrate the conclusions from
the preceding sections we have summarized, in Figure 4, the elements that
appear needed in an optimum user requirements process and the necessary
conditions that should be established for the elements to function effec-
tively. The needed elements are as follows:
o Continuing Process. Our analysis supports the conclusion of most
of the managers interviewed, that the ad hoc character of the
current process is a major weakness, and that a key to improved
effectiveness lies in developing continuity in the processes so
that user requirements data available to NASA and user managers
is uniformly current and authoritative. The conditions that are
necessary to accomplish this include the development of some form
of permanent requirements evaluation structure that allows NASA
and user personnel and interests to be focused jointly, with
successive iterations representing improvements and refinements
of preceding work. Experienced personnel should staff the pro-
cesses to assure that the guidance generated is relevant, and
that there are capabilities to cut through the inherent complexi-
ties of the subject matter.
o In-Pi ace Mechanisms with Feedback. The absence of follow-up in
the current processes—a major weakness—was most often attribu-
ted to the difficulty that both NASA and user personnel faced in
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determining who was responsible internally and externally for
requirements-related matters, together with the difficulty of
determijning__the__current status of a_p_revij>us action, study or
initiative. A major, and sometimes fruitless,'effort is fre-
quently involved just to lidentify the responsible officers and
the appropriate channels for communication. The necessary condi-
tions for establishing in-place mechanisms that allow routine
i ifeedback, are to define unambiguously the responsibilities for
user requirements development and interaction, and to designate
I I I I —the channels that are to be used vertically within NASA, and
horjzqntaljy. between_NASA, and_ the. other _agenc_Les and sector,s.
Then, personnel at variousistages in the process should learn how
to work in the defined context.
I
o Visibility. The credibility of the user requirements basis for
applications programs becomes subject to question when the tech-
nological parts of these programs proceed with little visibility
on the part of users. External visibility and some exchange and
coord i natron—of-planning rdata—provtdes- mutual -assurance" that'
there is at least the opportunity for interaction on matters
related to the user requirements. Exchange is needed in both
directions, so that the impact on user needs of proposed program
changes can be assessed by the users, and the impact of changes
the user's needs can be assessed by the remote sensing manager
o Representative Participation. One of the more difficult aspects
of the user requirements process is in determining who the users
are, and who should speak 'to requirements on their behalf. Per^
sonal contacts, self-initiated representation, and "peer group"
selection are the most common current methods. Some user agen-
cies have designated individuals on such matters. The most com-
mon complaint is that the(process is an "old-boy" network. The
necessary conditions for representative participation involve the
development of comprehensive data on the user communities. This
should include identification of individuals and groups of userrs,
and their special qualifications or interests in the user
requ-irement-s-eontex-t-j—^SeTee-t-i-on-er-i-t-er-i-a-shou-Td-be-deve-Toped-and-'
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disseminated so that the requirements process becomes recognized
as broadly based and representative of the full range of users.
o Standards for Evaluation. A current weakness is that the ad hoc
methods used to develop user requirements data are so different
from discipline-to-discipline and pro gram-to-pro gram, that com-
parisons and aggregations are difficult to generate, particularly
for broader budgetary or executive reviews. Minimum standards
for development and evaluation of requirements, together with
accepted definitions, are needed. The necessary conditions in-
volve the development of some accepted ground rules that would be
used broadly in developing user requirements data to conform to
minimal standards. These are complex to develop, but should
incorporate views from both ends of the requirements spectrum.
Objectives and priorities should be defined carefully to make
effective use of finite resources.
o Comprehensive. The user requirements process today seems fre-
quently to be operating at cross purposes in the sense that mis-
sion roles'shift and are sometimes ambiguous. We found widely
varying veiwpoints, for example, on the compatibility of
"research" and "operational" user requirements and NASA's role
with respect to these. It appears to some that these distinctions
are artificial and largely semantic, and to others that they are
real and should dominate. A weakness in the user requirements
process has been the inconsistent NASA and user approach in this
area. A necessary condition for the evolution of a comprehensive
user requirements process is clarification of the NASA role with
respect to research, experimentation, demonstration and opera-
tional user objectives.
In the course of our evaluation we found consistent identification of some
or all of the elements above as needed in an effective user requirements
process. There was also a consistent recognition that these elements are
not equally present in many of the mechanisms that are available to be
used. The evolution of improved user requirements processes entails
management emphasis on these elements when the opportunities occur.
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3.3 CONCLUSION AND ISSUES
The baseline characterization of the user requirements process, that was
outlined by the NASA sponsoring organization at the beginning of our
review, was found to be a generally accurate portrayal of the current
processes and reflects the problems encountered. The current ad hoc pro-
cesses tend to leave programs disconnected from users, and particularly
vulnerable during the multi-year development cycle especially when chal-
lenged on the basis of user needs. Some of the weaknesses in the current
processes can be overcome through employment of the elements identified
with optimum processes, and those elements should be emphasized whenever
possible.
It is apparent from the foregoing discussion that no single approach is
likely to dominate all others in terms of effectiveness, and that the
development of increasingly sound user requirements processes for NASA
terrestrial remote sensing activities will be both evolutionary and
involve balanced combinations of mechanisms that integrate NASA and user
interests in a continuing process. NASA and user interests need to be
combined in a more authoritative way.
There are, finally, several issues that go well beyond user requirements,
as such, but have a fundamental impact on those processes.
o NASA Role. One of the most pervasive issues encountered in our
review involved the question of the limits of NASA's role and
responsibilities for different types of user requirements beyond
narrowly defined scientific research. The widely ranging views
and lack of consensus on this complex question are evident from
the discussion in the preceding sections. Ambiguity, however,
both internal and external to NASA, has a profoundly adverse
affect on the development of sound, user requirements data by
senior and middle-level managers on both sides, because it intro-
duces fundamental uncertainty concerning technical objectives,
concerning who the "users" are, and concerning what interests of
theirs should be served. There is no basis for a partnership.
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Many observers felt that a narrow "research" interpretation of
the 1958 Space Act by NASA failed to square realistically with the
rapid evolution of technological possibilities that has occurred
in the applications area. Transitional stages from research to
demonstration to operation are more difficult to identify today.
Ozone layer "research", for example, was deemed by some to be as
"operational" as crop monitoring. External users, in particular,
were uncertain about government agency roles (NASA-NOAA-DOD) and
within the NASA context, were often confused by fine mission
distinctions in either direction made by NASA personnel. Clari-
fication of roles and responsibilities within NASA, and between
NASA and other organizations, will facilitate, among other
things, the development of more stable and effective user
requirements processes. '
o Information Management. The user requirements process represents
a major problem in information management; that is, the organiza-
tion and communication of data. Except perhaps for some basic
scientific research, the number and complexity of stages involved
in the total translation process, from initial identification of
user information needs to the development of cost effective tech-
nical responses, are far too large to be managed efficiently from
either end of the user requirements process. The total process
necessarily, will be segmented, and some degree of specialization
will be needed at different stages. Continuing attention should
be given to the question of long range design and development of
data systems that support vertical communication needs within
NASA and horizontal needs in both directions between NASA and
external users. The future capabilities and outlook for on-line
computerized processing and dissemination of products of NASA
remote sensing systems also has a range of embodied NASA-user
issues.
o Priority. Tackling the user requirements process by itself is
difficult because user requirements are only a part of the total
planning process. In most fields, also, remote sensing data is
only one of several potential sources, and there is dynamic
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interaction among sources in a number of fields. We found, how-
ever, generally widespread frustration with the current user
requirements processes, and little consensus on what to do about
it. At the same time, we encountered the repeated admonition that
unless the user-oriented basis of a program is established
soundly, it will fail in the long run. These raise the issues of
how to establish the priorities and set concrete goals in the
technical programs that provide the basis for measuring success
or failure in terms of satisfying user needs.
National Policy. The absence .of credible national policy con-
cerning civil space programs in general is a major deterrent to
the development of sound user requirements data. Some potential
users doubt the utility of putting forth the effort to define
their needs in relation to remote sensing. The policies that
culminated in NSC/PD-54 are widely regarded as "inoperative".
There is also widespread skepticism over the feasibility, at the
present stage, of turning over the operation of civil land remote
sensing satellite systems to the private sector under conditions
that simultaneously meet the necessary private return-on-invest-
ment criteria, and the necessary government control criteria.
Emerging foreign programs in some fields is further complicating
the picture.
Rationalized Approaches. In general, the differences of view
concerning many aspects of NASA-user interaction, and the user
requirements process, are so extensive that personnel at various
stages frequently are ineffective because they are working at
cross purposes, or because they are uncertain of their roles or
objectives. It would benefit NASA and users to resolve or narrow
these differences, at the very least in terms of government or
•NASA policy. To be effective, people must know who is respon-
sible, know what the channels are, and be comfortable with the
arrangements. The issue is how to balance the emphasis on dif-
ferent facets of the total process to accomplish those ends.
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3.4 RECOMMENDATIONS
It is difficult to advance concrete recommendations with confidence, given
the complexity of the topic and the independence and scope of this review.
In particular, we cannot demonstrate whether our findings are the rule, or
are exceptions to general practices. When relationships or views were
found consistently, or were projected as generalizations by those inter-
viewed or in documentation, we accepted them as probably the rule. We
developed, of course, an extensive amount of detailed data that cannot be
presented in a summary. Throughout, we attempted to evaluate data indepen-
dently, as we found it, without initial regard for its bureaucratic or
policy sensitivity.
We recommend that consideration be given to the following: ;
o Circulate all or parts of this Report as a basis for management
discussion, and to determine how representative its findings are
with the views of other NASA or user managers. In that process
seek to develop a consensus as to key current issues concerning
user requirements and identify priorities.
o Use the Report as background in further evaluating the strength
and adequacy of NASA-user interactions and the status of user
requirements for individual programs or areas of research.
o At face value, it appears that it would be advantageous for NASA
to have an identified organizational point of focus for consoli-
dation and oversight of the user requirements processes.
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APPENDIX: GEOLOGICAL MAPPING AND DOMESTIC CROP REPORTING
APPENDIX: Geologic Mapping and Domestic Crop Reporting
We reviewed two subject areas, geologic mapping and domestic crop
reporting, in greater depth than others to provide additional insights
into the problems associated with the development and management of user
requirements data for remote sensing in complex fields that have long
established conventional practices and sources of data. In all, about 40
in-depth interviews were conducted with personnel in these fields, and we
reviewed a wide range of related documentation. A detailed account of this
material is beyond the scope of the present written Report. Some selected
data and observations, however, are provided in the following sections.
Geologic Mapping
Geologic mapping is a continuing large scale activity conducted by govern-
ment and industry to support decisions at many levels. These range from
direct exploration for minerals or energy resources by private companies,
to the management and leasing of federal and state lands by the government.
Geologic maps present compositional, structural and chronological informa-
tion needed to reconstruct the geologic evolution of a region or area of
interest. The circumstances of the formation of rock units and their
structural features influence, among other things, the occurrence of ore
and petroleum deposits. In short, a geologic map depicts spatial arrange-
ments of rocks at the surface and attempts to project the subsurface. It
models a 3-D view of the Earth, stripped of vegetation, water, soil and
culture, that depends on a combination of acquired data together with
theories and concepts.
Geologic maps are the result of reiterative data collection processes that
usually take a number of years to complete. In oversimplified terms, the
conventional approach is to have appropriate education, and then with pick
and hammer, compass, transportation (may include helicopter), and topo-
graphic maps or aerial photos for locational reference, perform on-the-
ground survey at various levels of detail. In addition to field data,
laboratory analyses are performed on field samples. Because of conven-
tional training and long traditions of on-the-ground survey, the vast
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majority of practicing geologists were estimated to place "remote sensing"
low on their usual list of tools and techniques. These attitudes are
changing, but slowly.
As a rule of thumb, it takes about 4 years, 20 man-years of effort, and
about $2 million, for USGS to complete one 1:2,500,000 scale quadrangle
(100 mi X 70 mi) reconnaissance geologic survey and its set of maps. These
are just the beginning of detailed knowledge. Conventional geologists
regard this relatively slow pace as simply a "fact of life" that is inher-
ent in the field. Virtually all geologists believe it would be valuable to
move at a faster pace. There is a current need for geologic data that will
take many tens of years to acquire by conventional techniques. Remote ________
|sensing techniques offer the possibility of producing data from which /*
gedrolp conformation about large areas can be derived"~much~¥dFe~ rap idly
than by conventional techniques. At the same time, only a relatively small
number of geologists specialize in the direct use of remote sensing data as
a principal element in geologic mapping.
The judgment of these specialists is that remote sensing can contribute
significantly to the geologic mapping process in the areas of morphology,
structure, and lithologic mapping. The groundwork has been laid with
Landsat for the widespread use of synoptic image data for regional struc-
tural interpretation. Questions exist concerning the origin and import-
ance of linear features (lineaments), their geologic age, their vertical
extent, and their importance as conduits for magma and ore fluids. While
much has been learned about the present state of the Earth's crust and
mantle by geophysical methods, in particular seismology, the history of
most of the past geologic events is finally recorded on the surface.
Remote sensing is regarded as a powerful technique with which to unravel
this history. Remote sensing techniques alone, however, cannot solve
geologic problems. They must be used in combination with other data and
techniques.
There still remain many possibilities in geologic remote^sensing that will
require new instruments and techniques with which to explore. Some of the
future approaches include global stereoscopic imagery with spatial resolu-
tion many times better than Landsat; high spectral resolution imaging;
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exploitation of mid-infrared bands, multifrequency and multipolarization
radar systems; and active imaging systems in the near-and short-wavelength
infrared region utilizing tunable laser systems to obtain data in very
narrow spectral bands.
The principal geologic mapping in the U.S. is conducted by the USGS or by
private firms. The focus of these activities, however, is quite differ-
ent.
o USGS emphasis generally is on geologically mapping all of a
designated region or area, to provide a uniform standardized
assessment of the underlying geology and general resources
potential. The approach is very systematic and the USGS geolo-
gist is not really looking for anomolies, but only reporting
them when found. USGS operates in a predominately mapping en-
vironment, and its efforts are directed almost exclusively at
the 50 states.
o Private mining and exploration firms, on the other hand, focus
largely on detailed modeling of local geology within a region.
They are looking for specific locations that are promising for
drilling or exploitation. The private geologists are focused on
finding resources, and their interests are frequently world-wide
in scope.
A complex series of stages are involved in defining and translating user
remote sensing requirements for geologic mapping. These are illustrated
schematically in Figure 5, which also indicates the types of functional
output associated with the stages, the people involved, and some of the
problem areas. The very large dimensions of the information management
problem that the full process represents are clear. It seems apparent
also, that the full range is too complex to be managed effectively from
either the user or the operational ends of the process.
To be effective, a requirements determing system must provide for people
with geologic mapping expertise to engage in a process in which they
interact with people who have expertise in remote sensing. Practicing
geologists rarely have remote sensing expertise or computational expertise
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of the type needed for computer supported digital analyses of multi-
spectral data. NASA engineers, in turn, need to know what level of tech-
nological possibilities matters in relation to geologic mapping.
There is an extensive technical literature in the field that conveys the
results of research and experimentation in the use of Landsat and other
remote sensing products. An excellent summary article, for example, is
"Geologic Remote Sensing," written by Alexander Goetz (JPL) and Lawrence
Rowan (USGS), published in the February 1981 issue of the journal Science.
This article describes the state of the art across the field, and includes
some 60 references to other articles and sources. The main criticism that
we found with professional publications was the complex and time consuming
publication and review process.
A major problem with research findings is that they usually are onetime.
Then, the researcher moves on to the next development of interest. The
people who use the techniques and findings (private firms, etc.), don't
advertise their results. It is very rare to see publication of successful
operational uses of remote sensing in geology, although there are many, and
continuing, word-of-mouth examples. Some believe that considerably more
is being done by private companies than is generally known.
It is inherent in most geologist's professional training not to use remote
sensing for geologic mapping because it is not seen as sufficiently under-
stood to be repeatable. The conventional geologist is taught to rely on
ground survey (truth). Geologists cannot yet demonstrate a one-for-one
relationship between remotely sensed data and facts on the ground. Those
geologists who have used Landsat have found that they can do many times
more than they thought possible with the data. Spectral analyses, in
particular, have yielded unique information. A major gap, however, is that
the researchers still do not know what is really going on in the surface
chemistry that causes the detected phenomena.
There is a relatively close, informal, professional, relationship among
the small community of NASA-USGS-Industry-Academic personnel who are
actively engaged in research involving the application of NASA originated
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remote sensing data to geologic mapping needs. The high caliber of these
personnel and their work was apparent.
One of the most difficult user requirements areas to deal with in the field
of geologic mapping has been the private sector, partly because of the
•absence of formal relationships. In many respects, it seems that indus-
try's interests are as fragmented and diverse as those of the federal
Departments.
There were widely ranging views, for example, on the role and performance
of the private Geosat Committee, formed in the middle 1970's. The original
tenet was that there was a need for the private sector geologic community
to have a mechanism to communicate to NASA views on geologic user needs and
estimated value of information, similar to the relationship that USDA and
USDI had to NASA in the federal sector. The extensive 1976 Workshop report
on geologic user needs was cited by most observers as "still a pretty good
statement." The principal criticism was that it attempted to define
"requirements" largely in terms of resolution, spectral response, etc. in
the context of technological possibilities perceived by the participants
at the time, rather than in terms of data needs. Most of the participants
were not remote sensing specialists.
We found a basic issue to be that of defining the current role that a
mechanism like the Geosat Committee should have, and the type of inter-
action NASA should have with it. The views were varied, ranging from the
suggestion that it develop strengthen "technical subcommittees" to the
view that it should be pushing to make politicians more aware of the
benefits and uses that are flowing to U.S. industry from the Landsat
program and technology. The most common view was that it or something like
it, was needed as an interface between government and industry. "It should
listen to what NASA wants, listen to what industry wants, and help make the
connection between technical possibilities and user needs." Some
observers thought that, functioning as a non-profit group, it has been
trying to take on the whole broad field of geologic needs, without suffi-
cient staff or technical resources. A problem has been that companies
participating in the Geosat Committee have such widely varying interests
and perceptions of what is needed, that a consensus is difficult to
achieve.
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In general, there was a belief among the industry personnel we interviewed,
that there should be more participation by industry scientists at the early
end of NASA programs. The specific mechanisms were largely a matter of
indifference, as was the question of whether there needed to be specific or
implied powers in the industry-user's hands. As it was stated by one
observer: "there is little interest in dictating how industry views are
used, but considerable interest in assuring that NASA has a reliable means
of knowing what those views are." Comments on the NASA-Geosat test site
evaluation project were mixed. There was a common view that good technical
results were being achieved, but that long and tedious processes were
involved, including with computer processing of the simulated Thematic
Mapper data. The project has proven complicated to manage and coordinate,
in part, because of the complexities of government-industry interaction.
We found mixed views as to the significance of proprietary interests as
impediments to the exchange of data, and in evaluating user requirements
for various types of remotely sensed data. Industry personnel tended to
downplay its significance. It has been a common practice to show NASA
officials selected examples of results, at closed sessions, to assist NASA
decision-making and program support.
We found a general belief that the distinction between NASA's "R&D" role
and "operational" considerations is more a matter of semantics than a
significant distinction. "It's a Washington problem. . .". While there
are distinct "research" interests in many user areas, whether government
or private, they were viewed as having the common goal of improving geo-
logic mapping in the long run, and lacking significance if disconnected
from "operational" applications.
New phenomena are being noted all the time that require practical and
theoretical elaboration. For example, "it is being found that there is no
such thing as an absolute seal, geologically. As a result there is ver-
tical migration of hydrocarbons from subsurface entrapments. The seepage
causes geochemical changes that affect botony and reflect differential
compaction in the subsurface. These have significance to the exploration
geologists." HCMM and future thermal remote sensing systems are
"sleepers" in some geologists views.
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Throughout the review of the user requirements processes for geologic
mapping we found many examples of concrete applications and innovative
work in process. We also found the mechanisms for interaction to be
largely ad hoc and frequently informal.
As a generalization, it appears that in geologic mapping (as in other
fields), the development of technical data expressing the technical rela-
tionships between specific remote sensing techniques and information use-
ful to geologic mapping is far more advanced that the related organization
of users and their collective understanding of the potential benefits
remote sensing techniques may offer. The problem in part, is that there
has been little of no development of user requirements in a market-oriented
or similar context that allows parallel evaluation of the economic rela-
tionships or benefits of operational systems. NASA's role has been limited
to technical research and a somewhat ambiguous interaction with other
agencies and the private sector.
Domestic Crop Production Reporting
The relationships of NASA-originated remote sensing programs to USDA's
domestic crop production reporting responsibilities are similar in some
respects to those described for geologic mapping, but there are also
important differences.
o Domestic crop production reporting is based largely on conven-
tional on-the-ground surveying techniques that are extensive and
long-standing, extremely rigorous, and thoroughly documented.
In that sense, they are not unlike USGS practices in producing
various geologic maps by conventional techniques.
o In the agriculture case, probability survey data are gathered
every year country-wide by state and regional components, and
these data are combined and expanded statistically into highly
accurate estimates of aggregate national production for major
crops. Experimental application of NASA remote sensing, pri-
marily Landsat, has been aimed at reducing the margin of error in
the national estimates somewhat and improving by a greater
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—degree-the-accuracy-of-estimates—at-the-state-or—Towei—Teve-Tsi
Remote sensing products! are "calibrated" by ground truth data
collected for the probability survey, and then evaluated statisj
itically by the application of very powerful computers.
o In geologic mapping in| contrast, remote sensing is aimed at
iindependently improving the efficiency of on-the-ground geolpgie
phenomena not readily detectable on the ground;
IA major difference is also that the USDA isl responsible for
I I 1 —j-
reporting repetitively and maintaining crop-to-crop series, both
Lfore-ign and domes-t-i-c,—wjiile-USGS pr-ograms are more select'
longer, and largely domestic.
ve,
Domestic crop production reporting]by the USDA is based on conventional on-
the ground survey in conjunction with sophisticated statistical analyses
that are highly standardized and computerized. It is necessary to under-^
stand these conventional techniques to appreciate the role and future
utility of NASA originated remote sensing. It is obvious, on review, that
£ fie ~app~l i"catfi"ons~ of "NASA" remote" sending" to" crop" pToducti"on~repbr"t~ing~bn
foreign areas involve different sets of conditions and constraints, par^
ticularly in the use of ground truth to "train" computer analyses of
remotely sensed products. The following paragraphs describe the domestic
reporting program, in brief. ,
An orderly agricultural production and marketing system depends on an
accurate and current accounting of potential output, available stocks, and
the other factors that influence agriculture. USDA Domestic Crop Pro( uc-,
— tion Reporting is, therefore, a basic continuing large scale activity that
supports decision-making at many levels, ranging from private sector;
marketing and distribution of products in the U.S. and abroad, to a variety
of federal, state and local legislated functions. Crop reporting is the
epitome of a federal "old line" 'agency program that uses sophisticatec
advanced techniques in discharging its responsibilities.
The Statistical Reporting Servicel (SRS) of the Department annually pub-
lishes hundreds of official reports detailing production and economic
,prosp.ec.ts_f.or_crop.s.,_lj\v.es.t.o.ck.,_daj.r:y_and_p.o.u.lJ:r.y.. Ge.ar_e.d_t.o.w.ar_d_p.r_oj
ducers (farmers), this information is intended to help producers plan
LzoJ
their planting, feeding, breeding and marketing programs. The data also
are used by agricultural services and businesses, trade groups and finan-
cial organizations to determine needed inputs, resources, transportation,
and storage related to crop and livestock products.
Agriculture is the nation's biggest industry, and the nation's largest
employer, with 14 to 17 million people working in some phase. Farming,
itself, uses about 3.6 million workers, and 8 to 10 million people are
involved in storing, transporting, processing, and merchandising the out-
put. In all, about one out of every five jobs in private enterprise is
related to agriculture. Because of its size and diversity, American
agriculture is continually counted, measured, weighed, and priced to make
it operate effectively and efficiently. There is close continuing
cooperation and coordination of efforts between USDA offices and counter-
part organizations at the state levels.
The unique qualities of the estimates issued by the SRS are their objec-
tivity, comprehensiveness and reputation for accuracy. The methods
employed in developing the official reports are all geared to maintaining
the integrity of the estimates, because decisions involving literally
billions of dollars a year are made by farmers, businessmen, and Government
officials on the basis of agricultural estimates.
The overriding need for integrity, reliability, and impartiality in agri-
cultural estimates is reflected in the laws, regulations, and procedures
that govern the work of the Statistical Reporting Service.
Five titles and 17 separate sections of the United States Code are speci-
fically addressed to issuing crop and livestock estimates. They govern
most of the major operations of SRS, such as the security procedures and
the exact timing for release of major reports. For example, the law
requiring the Department to issue a monthly Crop Report says:
"The data for the monthly Crop Report must be collected from practical
farms in so far as possible. It must be printed and distributed
before the 12th of each month. It must embrace statements on the
conditions of crops by states and for the United States. It must
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contain such explanations and comparisons as may be useful. It must
be officially approved by the Secretary of Agriculture before issu-
ance."
The widely known Crop Reporting Board symbolizes the care taken by SRS to
protect the integrity of its estimates.
While Crop Reports are being prepared, the Board rooms are locked and
placed under uniformed guards who also patrol the area outside the lockup
quarters. The SRS computer system is also secured against tampering.
There is no communication out of the area.
After the report is assembled, it is signed by all members of the Crop
Reporting Board. The report is then reviewed and signed by the Secreatary
of Agriculture (or Acting Secretary). However, no one has access to the
survey data for the major producing States before the lockup begins and the
Secretary or his representative does not see the report until he enters the
lockup area to sign the report just prior to release.
The Board releases its reports to the public and news media at the times
specified by law.
Crop Reporting
Domestic crop reports provide estimates of acreages that farmers intend to
plant in a coming season, the acres planted and harvested, the final
production and disposition of the crop, and remaining stocks. Forecasts of
yields for major crops are issued monthly during the growing season.
The two main elements in determining the prospective size of the crop are
relatively straightforward; acreage and average yield per acre. Acreage
times yield, minus harvesting and distribution losses, equals the crop.
All estimates programs attempt to calculate these two main elements for
each crop cycle as accurately and as promptly as dollars and personnel
allow. The SRS data collection apd analysis methods are comprehensive,
long-standing, and thoroughly documented.
Information is collected in many ways: mail surveys, telephone contacts,
personal interviews, and in-the-field observations. Augmentation of these
methods with remote sensing data is in pilot program stages.
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For the most part, SRS bases its estimates on sample surveys. Sampling is
less costly in time and money than a co mplete count, and can be more
reliable.
Mail Surveys
In most mail surveys, questionnaires are sent to a general purpose sample
of farmers as a means of collecting information for an array of agricul-
tural activities: acreges, yield and production, live-stock and poultry
inventories, intentions to produce, farm employment and wages.
Probability Surveys
To overcome the shortcomings of general mail surveys, SRS developed and
implemented probability surveys in much of its work. Statistical theory
provides the basis for selecting samples so that the change, or prob-
ability, of each farm or farmer being in the sample can be computed. This
offers three definite advantages:
o First, since sampling errors can be determined, estimates can be
made with a known degree of precision.
o Second, since the probability sample assures a cross section of
U.S. farms, the estimates are not biased as they may be when the
sample is not representative as in the older mail surveys.
o Third, the results of the survey stand alone and do not depend
upon relationships to any other set of data, such as a census.
SRS probability surveys generally are based on contacts with farmers with
land in areas selected for sampling - an area frame. Or based on a sample
from a list of producers - a list frame.
o The area frame portion of USDA's probability surveys uses a
sample of randomly selected land segments, varying in size but
averaging about one square mile in major agricultural areas. In
most states, the area frame is stratified for sampling purposes
into four broad categories: areas intensively cultivated for
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crops; extensive areas used for grazing and livestock; residen-
tial and business land in cities and towns; and non-agricultural
land. Segments are defined within each stratum, and a sample is
selected.
o The chief advantages of the land area frame are that it provides
complete coverage, is not made obsolete by changes in farm
boundaries or operators, and offers safeguards against omission
and duplication.
o An additional sample source is needed, however, for surveys in
which the commodity to be estimated is highly concentrated, such
as cattle, hogs, poultry, rice, or potatoes. Estimates of these
demand more precision than is available from an area sample, and
SRS maintains list frames consisting of names and addresses of
producers and the size of their units, which are sampled for
survey purposes. The lists are kept current by checking names
against census data, assessors' files, associations, other USDA
lists, and other sources.
o SRS frequently takes advantage of the attributes of the area and
list frame samples together, a technique called multiple frame
sampling.
Nationwide Enumerative Surveys
Each June and December, SRS conducts a major survey based on samples
selected from area and list frames. The farmers are visited by SRS field
interviewers—enumerators—for a firsthand accounting of agricultural
activities.
The June Enumerative Survey (JES) is conducted during a two-week period,
and collects data on crop acreages, livestock numbers, farm labor and wages
and produces State, regional, and national estimates.
The December Enumerative Survey covers a subsample of the farms visited in
June to provide data for estimates of livestock inventories and produc-
tion, and acres seeded to fall grain crops.
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The probability sample of June includes about 16,000 area segments—
roughly 0.7 of 1 percent of the total land area in 48 contiguous States--
and will turn up some 60,000 farm operators for interviews. Enumerators
also will contact approximately 17,000 extremely large livestock farms.
A typical Corn Belt State will have a sample of about 324 segments. The
Southern States with their diversified agriculture will average 425 seg-
ments. Texas and California have 850 and 1,000 segments, respectively.
Enumerators, working out of State offices, use county road maps and aerial
photographs to define precisely the boundaries of the selected area seg-
ments. After locating the appropriate farmers, the enumerators explains
the purpose and importance of the survey and asks a specific series of
questions. All survey answers by the operators are carefully recorded.
The completed questionnaires are sent to the SRS field offices where they
are checked for completeness and consistency for use in making the esti-
mates.
A number of quality controls maintain the integrity of the survey: careful
selection and training of the 1,500 part-time enumerators, detailed
instruction manuals, close field supervision, built-in questionnaire
checks, comparison of reported acreages with acreages measured on the
aerial photographs, and reeumeration of some segments by supervisors.
Sampling errors for major agricultural items from the June Survey average
about 4 to 8 percent on a State basis, about 2 to 3 percent on a regional
level, and about 1 to 2 percent for U.S. totals. A sampling error of 1
percent means that chances are about 2 out of 3 that the sample estimate is
within 1 percent of the result that would be obtained if the same procedure
were used to survey the entire population rather than just a sample of it.
Objective Yield Surveys
Thousands of fields located in the 16,000 segments selected for the June
Enumerative Survey are visited during the growing season for plant counts
and measurements and crop development information to determine yields and
to project production.
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Enumerators, with the farmer's permission, walk a given number of rows and
paces into the selected fields and mark off a sample unit, no matter what
the condition of the field or quality of the crop at the unit. This
practice assures objectivity by removing the human bias that could affect
the ultimate estimate. These objective yield surveys are conducted mainly
for corn, wheat, cotton, soybeans, and potatoes.
In a recent year, sample plots were located in 3,400 corn fields in 20
major producicng States, 2,500 cotton fields in 14 states, over 1,600
soybean fields in 14 States, nearly 1,900 winter wheat fields in 15 States,
and 2,100 potato fields in 12 States.
At the designated units in the field, the enumerator counts the number of
plants and measures the distance between rows (plant population), and
determines the stage of development for a gauge to yield per plant.
With the data on plant population per acre and projected yield per plant,
statisticians can arrive at an estimate of yield per acre. They multiply
this by the acres for harvest in the State for State production forecasts.
The enumerator repeats his visits monthly during the growing season. When
the crop is mature, he hand harvests the sample unit and sends some of it
to an SRS laboratory for analysis. After the farmer harvests the field,
the enumerator makes a final visit to glean a small section to help indi-
cate harvesting loss and arrive at a net yield estimate.
The annual cycle of crop estimates begins with reports of farmers' planting
intentions, followed by an estimate of acreage actually planted, yield and
production forecasts during the growing season, and ends with estimates of
harvested acreage, production, and disposition of the crop.
Acreage surveys cover three important periods during the crop production
year. The first surveys are for January 1 and April 1 to determine acreage
farmers intend to plant in the coming season, based on main responses of
more than 100,000 farmers. Acreages actually planted may differ from
intentions because of changes in weather conditions, Government programs,
or the influence of the report itself.
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The second major survey period is early June when most crops are in the
ground, with estimate based on information from the June Enumerative
Survey and responses from questionnaires mailied to farmers. The acreage
estimates are the basis used to compute production August through
November.
In some years, weather or other conditions may cause acreage losses or
force growers to alter their late planting and utilization plans. An
acreage survey is conducted each July to update acreage estimates based on
the early June surveys, the first update data appear in the August Crop
Production report.
Ideally, new acreage surveys should be carried out when changing condi-
tions develop, but such surveys are expensive and cannot be conducted
without considerable preparation. The same conditions limit special crop
production surveys between regularly scheduled surveys.
The third acreage survey effort is in the fall to measure acres actually
harvested.
Early in the crop season, farmers are asked by mail questionnaire to
evaluate their crop in terms of its present condition in relation to a
normal conditions, taking into account seasonal progress, weather,
insects, fertilizer use, and other cultural practices. The aggregate of
these indications for a State is then evaluated in relation to h istoric
yields and reported by SRS.
During the growing season, SRS relies heavily on information from the
objective yield surveys, supplemented by farmers' mail responses about
prospects, to indicate yields of corn, cotton, wheat, and soybeans. For
other crops, the judgement of the producer provides the major yield data.
These indications are translated into State, regional, and national fore-
casts by means of regression charts on which probable yields are plotted
against final yields over a series of years.
SRS revises its estimate periodically, not as a matter of correcting
history, but to provide a better base for current and future estimates.
Revisions are made annually for products for which sufficient check data
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are available. When check data for a crop become available after harvest j
the official estimates of output may be revised.
I
There are [many incentives throughout the crop reporting~process to have it
work accurately and effectively, j The farmers, processors, distributors,
etc., all need accurate and timely data for the thousands of individual
decisions made in whole or in part of the basis of crop reporting at the
county, state, national and international level. I
i i •USDA methods for crop production reporting, as described above, are so lone
standing and statistically rigorous, that enhancements via remote sensinc
techniques are~"hec~e~s'sarTTy Tfmitljcl, "and Rave ~b~gen~hemd1 ed very carefully
the
the
conventional techniques; namely, to attempt to find objective, repeatable
improvements that are cost effective and can be sustained as routine parts
of the reporting process. I
to assure that the remote sensing enhancements can be coupled to
conventionally derived data. The objectives have been the same as with
The _SRS_ approached_the ^e__of_Lan dj,at_ on_ a_p ijot_pro j ect ^ asjs »_t»eg i nr inc
at the state level with Iowa, which is perhaps the most homogeneous state
I | I
because of the extent and type crops. In 1978 the detailed "ground truth1
from the roughly 300 ground survey segments (one-mile x one-mile) in
were used to "train" a computerijzed classification of the millions
owa
of
pixels contained in some 12 Landsat; scenes covering Iowa that were acquired
at the height of the growing season (August to early September),
resulting data were used to reduce the estimate error embodied in
The
the
conventional data. At the state llevel, the additional accuracy of crop
acreage estimate was such that two !and one-half times as much ground survey
I ~T
would have been needed to equal the accuracy results obtained by using the
original ground survey data, enhanced by the results of the Landsat analy-j
sis. The 1978 effort was slow, complicated, and aimed at demonstrating
that computer processing of properly registered Landsat imagery, "trained1!
by ground survey data, could yield useful results. This work, and other?
similar and follow-up investigations has been published. An extensive
body of technical literature exist's. The analytical effort has been car-^
ried forward in the Remote Sensing Branch of SRS, with refinements
J:echnj\que5_an.d_extensj.o.n_t.o_cav.er_ian_i.ncre.as.i.ng_numb.er_o.f_s.tates.
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~Det a i Is on the status of the work in USDA and the NASA-USDA interaction
through AgRISTARS are too extensive for presentation here, and the limited
account inthe_foregoing_section do not. do_justicejto. thje_scope of the USDA
and NASA 'activities. The major point is to recognize the complementary
role of remote sensing techniques Ito the conventional techniques, and the
importance of continuing interaction between NASA and jUSDA activities,
Many of the relationships and probjlems described in the body of the Report
apply to agricultural reporting. I
i !
With respect to remote sensing and the user requirements 1 the R&D role oT~
NASA and the operational role of USDA continue to represent a dichotomy.
NASA continues to be characterized as having "technical answers looking
for user applications," while USDA is characterized as performing legis-I i
lated functions of the kind described above that have their own conven-
tional data sources and complex histories. The incentive from the NASA
standpoint is to perform space-oriented technical research as broadly as
possible, while for USDA the incentive is to develop even modest improve^
ments on an already effective system. It is difficult to say what type oi
imbfoveme'n't ~(t"imeTirie"ss7 "accuracy! ~bre~adt~h~ efcr)" would ~Be~th~e~ most
important to try to achieve via remote sensing in the domestic crop producj
tion reporting. The SRS approach is to attempt improvements on all fronts]
and combine its remote sensing work with many parallel activities within
per?
ous
USDA. These include many types of applications beyond crop reporting,
se: land cover classification, forest and crop inventories of var:
types, soil erosion, disaster relief programs, etc.
Remote sensing techniques are widely used in USDA including air-borne
collection to support individual programs. Geographically-based informal
tion is accepted as a necessity.. The issues are generally over what
specific quality or quantity are needed, and the methods to employ. Remote
sensing was likened to the era ojf key-punching with computers. It is
simply recognized that much morel advanced techniques will become tech-}
nically and economically feasible.' The only question is when and how
long range transition can be made effectively.
the
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